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SUMMARY
We consider the problem of capacity expansion in telecommunication networks by
firms under uncertain economic conditions with various market structures. We assume
that the price-demand functions for network capacity have constant price-elasticity and
demand functions are parameterized by the index of a general economic condition that is
modeled by a discrete time Markov process. We apply dynamic programming to obtain
a state-dependent capacity expansion strategy that maximizes expected total discounted
cash flow.
Firm’s cost structure incorporates partial reversibility of investment by differentiating
the purchasing cost and the salvage value of the capacity. This partial reversibility makes
the value function non-differentiable and divides the solution space into BUY, KEEP, and
SELL regions. In addition, with the non-differentiable value function, it is hard to obtain an
analytical solution in general. By identifying certain structural properties of the optimal
solution, we perform a series of sensitivity analyses of optimal investment decisions with
respect to other market parameters. Under a typical condition in the telecommunications
market, which states that the level of cost depreciation is larger than that of the downside
movement of the economic condition in each time period, we are able to obtain analytical
expression for the optimal level and reduce the multi-period investment decision problem
into a single-period myopic problem. As a result, optimal capacity increment depends
only on the current economic condition.
We study this problem in both the monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures. In
particular, we investigate investment decisions of two firms in duopoly setting, assuming
that firms follow Cournot competition behaviors. We prove the existence and the unique-
ness of the Cournot equilibrium strategies in the duopolistic capacity investment problem.
In addition, we show how competition between firms affects through total capacity in the
ix
market in usage, capacity price, the consumer surplus, expected time to a certain level of
price reduction, and the expected time to the first investment. We perform an empirical
analysis to test a theoretical prediction obtained from our model through linear regression
utilizing historical market data. By examining several alternative indicies as a proxy to
the economic condition considered in our model, we show that the Civilian Employment





In this chapter, we present the background of our studies, including the motivation, related
previous research results, features of the proposed model, and contributions.
1.1 Motivation
Capital investment planning is one of the key business decision-making processes for almost
all firms. This investment decision includes initiating new projects, expanding existing
business, shrinking or discontinuing current business, and so forth. In any case, decisions
about the size and the timing of the investment is one of the most important assignments
for a managerial team. Specifically, in the telecommunications market and the computer
industry, the size of an expansion and the timing for the investment are crucial to the
health and survival of a firm. For example, the usage of the bandwidth is exponentially
increasing, so Internet service providers must respond to market demand qualitatively and
quantitatively in a timely manner.
The telecommunications industry used to be a regulated monopoly. Without competi-
tion, a firm needed only to find a solution that satisfied the exogenously given demand at a
fixed price. Therefore, relevant research focused on minimizing cost only. As deregulation
occurred, firms began to control prices. Now, a firm must consider the effect of price on
demand and at the same time, maximize profits. Thus, the challenge of the firm changes
to maximizing profits by determining prices and corresponding capital/capacity expansion
strategies from minimizing total cost through determining the capital/capacity expansion
policies only.
Very few papers address the discrete time and multiple time investment decision prob-
lem. When an investment decision problem is solved in a continuous time setting, the
1
resulting path of the capital/capacity movement might be difficult to determine in the
real world. For example, some studies have modeled demand as a geometric Brownian
motion in a continuous time frame, which results in a capital/capacity movement similar
to the demand movement. In that case, the expansion size can be infinitesimal, and thus
multiple expansions in a very short time interval are possible.
Considering the special characteristics of the telecommunications industry, we need to
address the following issues: First, the investment decision should be made recursively to
keep up with increasing demand, so we have to consider multiple-time investments, not a
one-time investment decision; second, the investment decision should be discrete in time,
which makes the size of the expansion lumpy; third, we should recognize that the unit cost
for the capacity expansion depreciates rapidly due to improvements in technology; fourth,
different from other industries, the telecommunications and computer industry demands
that we incorporate trends in market price, which is decreasing and demand, which is
increasing with time; a firm should consider the effect of competition between firms on
its investment decision on its investment decision. Competition behavior among firms
is addressed in several models: the Cournot model, the Bertrand model, the Stackelberg
model, and others. We have adopted the Cournot model to investigate investment behavior
in an oligopolistic market.
1.2 Literature Review
Numerous studies have dealt with the problem of the investment decision, which includes
expanding current business, starting new projects, suspending current production lines
for a certain period of time, and shutting down a company permanently. A traditional
method that deals with such decisions is the min-cost approach. Smith[40] considered
the decision of capacity expansion in terms of the timing of an investment by defining a
cost rate and minimizing this quantity. He showed that the equal timing policy minimizes
the present value of the investment cost. Using this cost rate, Ryan[39] established a
heuristic method that determined expansion times and expansion amounts using the (s,
2
S) policy. Bean, Higle, and Smith[7] considered the optimal capacity expansion problem
with stochastic demand. They showed that a stochastic problem could be changed to a
deterministic one using a modified interest rate that was smaller than the original interest
rate and approximately proportional to the uncertainty of demand.
Another big stream of investment-related research applied real option method to de-
termine the timing of investments. This method applies the valuation method of financial
options to estimate the opportunity cost of a investment. Adopting the concept of the ex-
ercise boundary of an American option, they try to pinpoint an optimal value of a project
or prices of a product that must be reached before an investment decision is made. Here,
the value of the project corresponds to the underlying security of the financial option,
and the investment should be made at the early exercise boundary of the option. Dixie
and Pindyck[11] analyzed the investment decision very exhaustively using this real option
analysis. McDonald and Siegel[32], [31] formulated the value of the option to invest in
an irreversible project and showed that this value could be as much as the investment
cost for the reasonable parameter values. They also calculated the value of an option to
shut down a production line temporarily at no cost when variable costs exceed operating
revenues. Even though the real option concept creates a considerable challenge to the
traditional Net Present Value (NPV) analysis, this method has a crucial weakness. When
we consider multiple-time investment decision, the calculation becomes complicated and
time consuming. Hubbard and Lehr[16] considered a two periods model of investment
with real option method. Few papers solve for more than two periods.
The value to wait, which should be added to the opportunity cost, comes from the fact
that the investment decision is totally/partially irreversible. This irreversibility should
be included in the investment decision model so that it can be applied to real world
investment problems. In Arrow[5], the aim of a firm is to maximize the sum of all the cash
flow discounted at the market rate of interest. He analyzed the change in the investment
path when he considered irreversibility in a deterministic and continuous time setting.
Abel and Eberly[2] defined and calculated the user costs of capital associated with the
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purchase (Cu) and sale (Cl) of capital, given the purchase and sell price of unit capital.
They found the optimality condition, which is, the marginal revenue product of capital
should be in the interval [Cl, Cu]. Bertola and Caballero[8] proposed and solved a model
of sequential irreversible investment and extended the result to the aggregated investment
in a continuous time setting.
As deregulation spreads throughout the electricity and telecommunications industries
the market is changing from monopolistic to duopolistic/oligopolistic. Many research
papers have analyzed changes in optimal investment decisions when market conditions
change. Some papers handle this issue of competitition by changing the price process
from endogenous to exogenous. Others handle this by applying oligopolistic behavior to
a market directly. In the latter case, they try to identify the Nash equilibrium point.
Leahy[26] showed that the option-value thresholds of a monopolistic firm are the same
as the free entry threshold of a competitive firm. Aguerrevere[4] studied the effect of
competitive interactions on investment decisions and on the dynamics of the price of a non-
storable commodity. White and Benson[44] illustrated the structure of the competitive
electricity market. They also showed the trends in total market share and price in several
electricity markets. Chuang, Wu, and Varaiya[9] explained the behavior of the firms in a
generation expansion planning under Cournot, Cournot duopoly, and Cartel assumptions.
Their results support the classic Cournot model. Hay and Liu[15] analyzed the behavior
of a firm in fragmented, dominant firm, and dominant group sectors. They suggested that
fragmented sectors are characterized by noncooperative investment behavior, dominant
group sectors by cooperative behavior, and dominant firm sectors by competitive behavior.
1.3 Features in the Proposed Model
1. Market uncertainty in economic indicator:
Some papers model market demand and/or market price as a stochastic process that
is exogenously given. Abel[1] modeled the price of output as a geometric Brownian
motion. Abel and Eberly[2] modeled demand as a stochastic process which depends
4
on a random variable which evolves exogenously according to a geometric Brownian
motion and in [3], they used Brownian motion to model randomness in technology,
and/or randomness of the variable cost in demand. Aguerrevere[4] and d’Halluin,
Forsyth, and Vetzal[10] modeled the demand as a geometric Brownian motion. But
there are some research going on about network traffic which shows demand is not
well represented by geometric Brownian motion. For more detailed explanation, refer
to Riedi and Ribeiro[38], Ma[29], Nor, Yahya, and Ihsanto[36] and Yang[45]. Kou
and Kou[22] specified two economic indicators: general economic conditions which
are exogenously given, and sector/industry-specific economic conditions which can
be endogenously calculated. They modeled the growth stocks using sector/industry-
specific economic conditions, which can be represented by the total research and
developement labor growth rate in such a sector/industry.
We model the general economic condition as a discrete Markov process, which is
more general than (geometric) Brownian motion. Of course, by using a discrete
Markov process, we can also approximate the geometric Brownian motion but with
more flexibility.
2. Characteristics of demand:
• Constant elasticity: We assume that the price-demand function has a constant
price-elasticity of demand and is parameterized by the index of general economic
conditions, which are modeled by discrete Markov processes. The iso-elastic demand
function is frequently used in the investment model. Abel and Eberly[1], Kou and
Kou[22] Mitra and Wang[35], and Kenyon and Cheliotis[20] also used this iso-elastic
demand function in their papers. In addition, ε > 1 is a common assumption in
the telecommunications industry. Following the work of Lanning, Mitra, Wang, and
Wright[25], we assume elasticity is between 1.28 and 2.84.
3. Market structures:
• Monopolistic market: In a monopolistic market, a company is a price maker.
5
Therefore, it can control the demand by setting the price level. Also, it looks for the
optimal capacity and price together through the price-demand function.
• Oligopolistic market: Firms in the market are non-cooperative competitive. We
adopt the Cournot model to investigate the investment behavior of the firms in an
oligopolistic market. We consider the cases of both of symmetric and asymmetric
firms.
4. Capital/Capacity investment decision:
• Value function: The objective function is a firm’s expected total discounted cash
flow. We try to find an optimal capacity/price that maximizes this objective func-
tion. When the market structure is one of a regulated monopoly, the exogenous
demand model and min-cost models were reasonable. However the recent change
in the industry, featured by relaxed regulation and more competition, forces firms
to consider their combined revenue and costs by influencing the demand through
pricing.
• Partial reversibility of capacity investment: A considerable number of studies deal
with this irreversibility. The real option approach is well known method that ad-
dresses irreversibility in a systematic way. Traditionally, it has been common sense
for a firm to invest in a project when the present value of the project is greater
than or equal to zero. However, recent studied have shown that this present value
analysis can be wrong. When investment is irreversible, the firm should consider
the option of delaying investment, and the option should be properly valued. This
real option approach is simple and well applied when the investment is a one time
decision. However, when a firm has to consider a series of investments, the real op-
tion approach is not appropriate because of exponentially increasing complexity. In
addition, Grenadier[14] showed that option holders (in this case, project managers)
have to consider that the competition between the market players and the value of
waiting for the investment is not considerable in the competitive market and the
6
classical NPV analysis is approximately accurate. Another way to incorporate ir-
reversibility is to consider only incremental investment. In this case, reducing the
present capital is not considered.
We incorporate this irreversibility of the investment by differentiating the purchasing
price and the salvage value. With these two different values, we can consider a
partially reversible investment decision. In addition, this model encompasses the
cases of completely irreversible investment and costlessly reversible investment by
setting the salvage value at zero, and by setting the salvage value to be the same as
the purchase price respectively. By making the difference between the purchase price
and the salvage value broad, we have a broad range of optimal capacity instead of one
optimal point. In other words, we have minimum optimal capacity and maximum
optimal capacity by differentiating the purchase price from the salvage value.
• Discrete and multiple-time expansion: We consider discrete and multiple-time
investment. In other words, investment decisions can be made quarterly or monthly.
Therefore, the resulting capital/capacity path takes a step function form, and the
investment size is lumpy. Because an infinitesimal increment in capacity during an
infinitesimal period is not realistic, particularly in the telecommunications industry,
the discrete time model is more practical than the continuous time model.
1.4 Contributions
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the investment behavior of a company under
uncertain economic conditions. We formulate the problem as a discrete Markov decision
problem. We obtain the optimal investment strategy, which depends on the states of
the capacity of the previous period and current economic condition. By incorporating a
broad range of state space, the model is applied to entry firms, well-established firms, and
over-invested firms. Furthermore the trade-off between the lost revenue due to current
insufficient capacity and the opportunity cost of a premature investment resulting from
the foregone reduced investment cost due to technology advancement is examined.
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We first examine the monopolistic market. We identify the linear relationship between
the optimal solutions and the general economic condition. Using this linearity, we perform
a series of sensitivity analyses. Under a typical parameter setting in a telecommunications
industry, we obtain analytic expression of the optimal solution. Moreover, we investigate
the price and demand trends in the market and then obtain analytical expressions for
them. The result is consistent to the findings of the previous studies by Kenyon and
Cheliotis[20], [21] and [19]. In addition, we perform a series of sensitivity analyses and
show how the optimal investment decision changes with the parameters.
We then study the firm’s investment behavior in an oligopolistic market. In particular,
we investigate a duopoly model in which two firms follow the Cournot behavior. We show
that the equilibrium point for the two-firm case exists and is unique analytically and
numerically. We also investigate the effect of competition on market properties through
total market capacity under usage, market price, consumer surplus, expected time of a
certain price reduction, and expected time until the first capacity expansion.
Finally, using real market data, we try to show the validity of the proposed model.
1.5 Outline
The remaining dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we formulate the capacity
investment problem in a monopolistic market 1. We illustrate the structure of the solution
and perform a series of sensitivity analyses. Using the structure of the solution, we find
an analytic expression for the optimal capacity and the price under a typical condition in
the telecommunications market. In addition, we show an optimal capacity trend and the
corresponding price trend. Finally, we perform an experiment with a certain parameter set
and show numerical results. In chapter 3, we consider the capacity investment problem in
an oligopolistic market. By adopting the Cournot model, we illustrate investment behavior
of the firms in a competitive market. We study the existence and the uniqueness of Cournot
equilibrium point in the case of symmetric firms and asymmetric firms. How competition
1This section is based on the work at Bell Labs, where I was a summer intern 2002.
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affects the market properties is explored through total market capacity, market price,
consumer surplus, expected time of a certain price reduction, and expected time until
the first capacity expansion. In chapter 4, using market data from telecommunications
companies, we perform linear regression analysis and validate the proposed model.
9
CHAPTER II
THE INVESTMENT STRATEGY OF A MONOPOLISTIC
FIRM
In this section, we study the capacity investment decisions of a monopolistic company.
In a monopolistic market, a company is a price maker and thus controls market demand
by changing the price. We address this investment decision problem in a discrete time
framework with time horizon T . One period can be a year, a quarter, a month, a week,
and so forth, depending on the problem characteristics. At the beginning of each period,
say t period, the firm is given the capacity (xt−1) of the previous period. It then needs to
decide the optimal capacity (x∗t ) of the current period considering the general economic
condition (ξt).
The increment (or decrement) x̂t = xt − xt−1. Depending on the sign of x̂t, a firm
can choose three different actions, which are buy, sell, and maintain the capacity of the
previous period. Figure 1 shows one possible path of the capacity evolution with time.
If the firm decides to invest in more capacity, it has to pay installation and increased
maintenance costs, but it can collect more revenue due to the increased capacity. If the
firm delays the investment decision and maintains the capacity of the previous period, it
can take advantage of cost depreciation that comes from technology advancement. If the
firm decides to retire some or all of the capacity of the previous period, it might get some
revenue from the selling off of the excess capacity, but it will lose the revenue due to the
reduced capacity. When the firm makes these investment decisions, it needs to consider
the current and expected future economic conditions. The general economic condition is
not deterministic, so we model it as a discrete Markov process.
By rephrasing the problem, it can be defined in the following way. Given two state
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Figure 1: Possible Path of Capacity Movement with Time.
(x∗t ) of the current period by maximizing the company’s expected total discounted cash
flow from time t to time horizon T . This capacity will stay constant until the end of the t
period. At the beginning of t+1 period, we need to determine again the optimal capacity
(x∗t+1) that will stay constant until the end of the t + 1 period, and so on.
2.1 Model Formulation
We start this section by modeling the features of our problem.
First, we explain the notation we use throughout the chapter.
ξt : general economic condition at the beginning of period t
Pt : market price for period t
Dt: market demand for period t
xt : capacity position at the beginning of period t
Rt: revenue during period t
Ct : total cost occurring during period t
FT: terminal value function
pt(i, j) = P {ξt+1 = ξj |ξt = ξi}: transition probability from ξi at time t
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to ξj at time t + 1
ηt : cost depreciation coefficient during period t
ε : elasticity of the price-demand function
T : time horizon
r : discount rate periodwise




As we mentioned in section 1.3, we employ an economic indicator, ξt, to model the
market uncertainty. Specifically, we model ξt as a discrete time Markov process with
a transition probability pt(i, j) from state i at time t to state j at time t + 1.
2. Price-demand function.








where Pt and Dt are price and demand at time t, respectively. The price-demand
function is scaled by ξt, which reflects the general economic condition. Also ξt can
be interpreted as the willingness to buy Dt when the price is 1. We call this a general






Here we assume that the price-elasticity of demand is constant, which is a common
assumption in telecommunications-related literature.
Depending on the value of ε, the investment behavior changes.
(a) If ε > 1, a company can increase its revenue by lowering the price and taking
advantage of increased demand.
(b) If ε = 1, the revenue of a company stays unchanged with respect to the price
movement and the corresponding demand change.
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(c) If ε < 1, a company can increase its revenue from a higher price and decreased
demand.
For more explanation of the relationship between ε and revenue, refer to Frank[12]
Kou and Kou[22] used the constant elasticity function with ε > 1. Kenyon and
Cheliotis[20] used equation(2.1.1) as their price-demand function and showed that
the trend of total market capacity is exponentially increasing and the price is expo-
nentially decreasing with time in the telecommunications industry, which confirms
that ε > 1. Therefor, we assume ε > 1 from now on.
3. Revenue.

















where xt is the firm’s capacity at time t. We set the demand equal to the capacity
level. In a monopolistic market, the firm can control the demand by changing the
market price. When the demand is greater than the capacity level, which is possible
under an improved economic condition, the firm can raise the price to decrease the
demand to the capacity level, and vice versa.
4. Cost.
Cost consists of three parts: maintenance cost, expansion cost, and salvage value.
We model these costs to be linear with capacity as follows.





A if A ≥ 0,
0 if A < 0.
(2.1.3)
bt: the coefficient of the unit-maintenance cost at time t.
at: the coefficient of the unit-expansion cost at time t.
ãt: the coefficient of the unit salvage value at time t.
Bertola and Caballero[8] used linear cost structure similar to ours, and the cost coef-
ficient is modeled by geometric Brownian motion and is given exogenously. Kenyon
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and Cheliotis[20] used a concave cost function considering economies of scale. Abel[1]
used a convex cost function, which is used frequently in the manufacturing industry.
Remark 1. bt, at, and ãt might be a function of the sector/industry-specific growth
rate. As Kou and Kou[22] indicated, the growth rate of the growth stock can be
represented by the industry-specific growth rate. Also, the growth rate is closely
related to the growth rate of the labor force in the research and development (R&D)
department. If the growth rate of the labor forth of the R&D department is large,
the cost coefficient decreases, and if the labor force of the R&D department is small,
then the cost coefficient will stay put with respect to time.
Here we assume that
(a) bt ≥ bt+1, at ≥ at+1 and ãt ≥ ãt+1.
(b) at ≥ ãt
The underlying reason of the assumption (a) is that the unit maintenance cost, unit
installation cost, and the unit salvage value tend to decrease, which reflects technol-
ogy improvement in the telecommunications market. Bertola and Caballero[8] used
a negative value for the drift when they model the cost coefficient as a geometric
Brownian motion. Kenyon and Cheliotis[20] assumed an exponentially decreasing
price/cost trend and in their numerical experiment, the price/cost depreciates by
half in two years.
The reasoning of assumption (b) is to incorporate irreversibility.
(a) If at = ãt, then the investment is totally reversible, which indicates that the
unit purchasing price is the same as the unit salvage value.
(b) If at > ãt, then the investment is partially reversible, which is a dominant
characteristic of the telecommunicationa and computer industry.
(c) If ãt = 0, then the investment is totally irreversible.
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The cost of a period is directly dependent on the investment decision, which falls
into one of the following three categories:
(a) SELL some part or all of the the capacity of the previous period. This will
happen when the economic condition is very bad and/or if there is too much
capacity from the previous period. In this case, we will get ãt(xt−1 − xt) as
our selling off profit and still pay the maintenance cost btxt for the remaining
capacity. Therefore, Ct = btxt − ãt(xt−1 − xt).
(b) KEEP the previous period capacity. This will happen when the economic condi-
tion has not been changed much from the previous period, and we have enough
capacity at hand. In this case, we need to pay the maintenance cost only.
Therefore, Ct = btxt.
(c) BUY some capacity and add to the capacity of the previous period. This case
is dominant among all three cases in the telecommunications industry. This
will happen when the economic condition improves, and we need to keep up
with increased demand from the improved economic condition. It will also
happen when the cost depreciation is steep, which results a drop in price and
corresponding increases in demand. In this case, we need to pay the installation
cost at(xt − xt−1) and the maintenance cost btxt as well. Therefore, Ct =
btxt + at(xt − xt−1).
5. Value Function.
The value function at time t is the maximum of the expected total discounted cash
flow of a firm from time t to time horizon T .









+ e−r(T−t)FT (xT−1, ξT )
]
,
where r is the expected return in one period and FT (xT−1, ξT ) is the terminal value
function. Here we assume that revenue is collected at the end of each period, and the
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cost is incurred at the beginning of each period, which explains e−r in the front of
Rt in the value function. We want to solve for a series of investment decisions from
time t onwards. At the beginning of each period t, we are given a state (xt−1, ξt),
and we need to solve for the optimal capacity (x∗t ) of the current period to maximize
the firm’s expected total discounted cash flow from time t to time horizon T .
2.2 Modeling Assumptions
In this section, we summarize all the assumptions that we make in our model.
1. The price elasticity of demand, ε, is constant, and ε > 1.
2. We assume that the market demand is the same as the capacity level of a firm.
3. bt ≥ bt+1, at ≥ at+1, and ãt ≥ ãt+1, which reflects cost depreciation from improve-
ments of technology.
4. at ≥ ãt, which represents the partial reversibility of the investment.
5. ηt is the cost depreciation coefficient at time t with ηt < 1. In addition, maintenance
cost, installation cost, and salvage value depreciate at the same rate as
(bt+1, at+1, ãt+1) = ηt(bt, at, ãt) with ηt < 1 for all t.
6. FT (xT−1, ξT ) is a concave function with respect to xT−1, which guarantees the
concavity of the value function at t. In addition, FT (xT−1, ξT ) is homogeneous, i.e.,
∀η > 0, FT (ηxT−1, ηξT ) = ηFT (xT−1, ξT ) .
With this assumption, the linearity between the optimal capacity and the economic
condition is established.
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2.3 The Structure of the Solution
The value function is the total expected discounted cash flow over time horizon T . Using
Bellman’s equation, the value function at t can be re-written as follows:


























To solve the problem, at first, let us define the Gb and Gs functions
1 as a derivative















































The solution to the above optimization problem belongs to one of the following three
cases.
1. (BUY):
Expand the current capacity. If x∗t,L is a solution for Gb(xt, ξt) = 0 and if xt−1 ≤ x
∗
t,L,
a firm needs to buy more capacity up to x∗t,L.
2. (SELL)
Cut off the excess capacity. If x∗t,U is a solution for Gs(xt, ξt) = 0 and if xt−1 ≥ x
∗
t,U ,
a firm needs to sell the excess capacity down to x∗t,U .
3. (KEEP)




1The subscript b in Gb means BUY and s in Gs means SELL.
17
Here we used the fact x∗t,L ≤ x
∗
t,U , which will be explained in Lemma 2.3.2.
To prove that there is a solution to the above set of equations (2.3.1),(2.3.2) and that
the solutions are unique, we first investigate the behavior of dE[Vt+1(xt,ξt+1|ξt)]dxt .
Theorem 2.3.1. If Vt+1 (xt, ξt+1) is a concave function with respect to xt, then Vt (xt−1, ξt)









Proof. See the proof in section 2.7.
Abel[1], Abel and Eberly[2], and Grenadier[14] assumed that the revenue function is
concave, which is consistent to our model. The intuition behind Theorem 2.3.1 is as
follows: If the capacity of the previous period is greater than or equal to x∗t+1,U , having
one more capacity has an ãt+1 value. If the capacity of the previous period is less than
x∗t+1,L, having one more capacity has an at+1 value. If the capacity of the previous period
is between x∗t+1,L and x
∗
t+1,U , then the value of the additional capacity in decreasing.
Aguerrevere[4] explained the underlying reason for Theorem 2.3.1 well using the real
option concept. He interpreted dVt+1(xt,ξt+1)dxt as the value of a marginal unit of capacity
and/or value of option to purchase an additional unit of capacity with a current capacity
level of xt. The value of the additional capacity is maximal when the current capacity is
not adequate. If we have sufficient capacity, then the value of the additional capacity is
minimal.
Lemma 2.3.2. Solution exist for the equations (2.3.1) and (2.3.2) and they are unique.
In addition, x∗t,L ≤ x
∗
t,U (equality is satisfied when at = ãt).
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Proof. Using the Gb and Gs functions, we can prove that solutions exist:
lim
xt↓0
Gb(xt, ξt) → ∞
lim
xt↑∞




Gs(xt, ξt) → ∞
lim
xt↑∞
Gs(xt, ξt) ' −bt − ãt + e
−rãt+1 < 0
Therefore, solutions exist for the equation (2.3.1) and (2.3.2).









The reason for the above equality is that as the capacity of the previous period goes to ∞,
the decision of this period tends to be SELL.









As the capacity of the previous period goes to zero, the decision of this period tends to be
BUY.
Next, with large enough T , we can ignore the effect of the terminal value function
FT on our investment decision at the current period. Then we can choose any concave
function for FT , say FT (xT−1, ξT |ξT−1) = 0 or FT (xT−1, ξT |ξT−1) = ãT xT−1. Then we can
use theorem 2.3.1 to prove the uniqueness of the solution. If we take the derivative of the




























here we used the concavity of the value function. Therefore, Gb(xt, ξt) and Gs(xt, ξt) are
monotonically decreasing functions, which guarantees the uniqueness of the solutions for
the equations (2.3.1) and (2.3.2).
Finally, by using the fact that Gb(xt, ξt) and Gs(xt, ξt), are monotonically decreasing




t,U from the assumption
at > (=)ãt.
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Figure 2: Solution space with respect to the capacity of the previous period
As we can see in Figure 2, we can divide the whole space of xt−1 into three pieces as
follows:
1. xt−1 ≤ x
∗
t,L: at time t, the firm is in the BUY region, and it needs to increase the
capacity up to x∗t,L.
2. x∗t,L ≤ xt−1 ≤ x
∗
t,U : at time t, the firm is in the KEEP region, and it maintains the
capacity of the previous period.
3. x∗t,U ≤ xt−1: at time t, the firm is in the SELL region, and it needs to sell off the
excess capacity down to x∗t,U .
Remark 2. Assumption (b), which is (at ≥ ãt), explains that the purchase price and the
salvage value are different. This reflects a partially reversible investment. This partial
reversibility divides our solution space into three pieces: BUY, KEEP, and SELL regions.
1. If we set at > ãt 6= 0, then the investment is partially reversible, and we will have
all three regions.
2. If we set at = ãt, then the investment is totally reversible. In this case, there is no
KEEP region in our solution space. Depending on the economic condition, we always
have to buy or sell the capacity.
3. If we set ãt = 0, then we barely sell the current capacity. Therefore, our solution
has no SELL region.
Theorem 2.3.4. For t = 1, ..., T , suppose Vt+1(xt, ξt+1) is homogeneous, i.e.,
∀η > 0, Vt+1(ηxt, ηξt+1) = ηVt+1(xt, ξt+1).
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Then
1. If the lower bound (upper bound) is x∗t,L(x
∗
t,U ) for ξt = ξ, then for ∀η > 0, the lower





2. Furthermore, Vt(xt−1, ξt) is also homogeneous.
Proof. See the proof in Baryshnicov, Sim, and Wang[6].
According to Theorem 2.3.4, x∗t,L and x
∗
t,U are linear functions of the economic indicator
ξt. Therefore, we can write the optimal solutions as follows:
x∗t,L(xt−1, ξt) = lt,Lξt
x∗t,U (xt−1, ξt) = lt,Uξt,
where lt,L, lt,U are the functions of other parameters except the economic indicator (ξt).
Figure 3 illustrates a possible solution structure. In the left-hand graph, the x-axis
represents economic indicator (ξt) at the beginning of period t, the y-axis represents the
capacity (xt−1) of the previous period and z-value represents optimal capacity x
∗
t (xt−1, ξt)
at the tth period. The right-hand graph is a projection of the left-hand graph. The figure
shows a clear division of space into three regions: the BUY, KEEP, and SELL regions.
Let us fix the economic indicator. Then, as capacity increases, the region shifts from
BUY to KEEP and from KEEP to SELL. Next, let us fix the capacity. Then as economic
indicator increases, the result changes from SELL to KEEP and from KEEP to BUY, which
is intuitively very accurate.
Remark 3. If we determine the value of the slopes of these two boundary lines, BUY/KEEP,
KEEP/SELL, the optimization problem is solved for every possible state of (xt−1, ξt).
Therefore, this optimization problem has been reduced to the problem of finding these
two slopes.
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Figure 3: Linearity between Optimal Capacity and Economic Indicator
respectively, and these slopes are bounded.
(
e−r(1 − 1ε )




e−r(1 − 1ε )




e−r(1 − 1ε )




e−r(1 − 1ε )
max(bt + ãt − e−rat+1, 0+)
)ε
Proof. Using Theorem 2.3.1 with at ≥ ãt (buy-sell gap) and (bt, at, ãt) ≥ (bt+1, at+1, ãt+1)
(cost depreciation), the proof is straightforward.
The idea behind the limits of the slopes for the boundaries are as follows:
1. When lt,L attains the lower bound: Regardless of the economic condition at t + 1,
the company should be in the BUY region at t and in the SELL region at t + 1.
However, this is very rare case and not very plausible.
2. When lt,L attains the upper bound: Regardless of the economic condition at t + 1,
the company should be in the BUY region at t and in the BUY region at t + 1. In
the telecommunications industry, the unit cost for capacity/capital depreciates quite
rapidly. In this case, the company might purchase more capacity even though the
expectation of the future general economic condition is bad.
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3. When lt,U attains the lower bound: Regardless of the economic condition at t + 1,
the company should be in the SELL region at t and in the SELL region at t + 1. If
in some industries, the unit installation/maintenance cost has an increasing trend,
the company tends to sell the current capacity to take advantage of the increased
salvage value when the general economic condition is bad.
4. When lt,U attains the upper bound: Regardless of the economic condition at t + 1,
the company should be in the SELL region at t and in the BUY region at t + 1.
However, this is very rare case and not very plausible.
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
From the previous section, we know that the lower and upper optimal capacities have a
linear relationship with the current economic indicator. Therefore, if we find the analytical
form of the slopes, then the problem is solved completely. However, even though there is
no analytical solution for the slopes in general, we can investigate how the slopes change
with respect to the parameters.
2.4.1 Cost Parameters vs. the Values of the Slopes
At first, we study the effect of the cost parameters on the values of the slopes. As we can
expect, the investment decision becomes conservative as the cost parameter increases.
Lemma 2.4.1. Let lower bound (upper bound) be x∗t,L(x
∗
t,U ) for the cost parameters
(bt, at, ãt).
If we scale the cost parameters as (ηbt, ηat, ηãt) for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T}, then for ∀η > 0,
the lower bound (upper bound) is η−εx∗t,L(η
−εx∗t,U ).
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Proof. With the new cost parameters (ηbt, ηat, ηãt), the value function at time t is


























t − (btxt + at(xt − xt−1)+ − ãt(xt−1 − xt)+)
)
































If the lower (upper) optimal capacity is x∗t,L(x
∗
t,U ) when the economic condition is ξt, then
the lower/upper optimal capacity is η−εx∗t,L(η
−εx∗t,U ) when the economic condition is η
−εξt
because of the linearity between the economic indicator and the optimal capacity.
With η < 1, we have increased the lower and upper bounds and expanded KEEP
region. In addition, the KEEP region is given by (η−εx∗t,L, η




which is broader than the original KEEP region with η < 1 and ε > 1. In addition to the
η effect, ε enforces this change. With large ε, the investment decision in more sensitive to
the cost parameters.
Let us explain the intuition behind Lemma 2.4.1. The price is directly related to the
cost parameters. Therefore, the lowered cost leads to the price reduction, which incurs
more demand in the market. Moreover, customers respond more sensitively to the change
of cost parameters with a larger value of ε. Therefore, the demand increases with smaller
η and this increase is enlarged with ε.
Figure 4 shows the changes in slopes with respect to cost changes. In the example, a
cost change is realized as a cost depreciation with time. We used the same cost depreciation
factor ηt = η for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T}. Therefore, the cost parameters at time t can be written
as
(bt, at, ãt) = η
t(b0, a0, ã0).
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Figure 4: Movement of the boundaries of the BUY/KEEP and KEEP/SELL regions from
t = 1 to t = 6. The parameters are η = 0.51/8 and ε = 1.5, respectively
At time period 1, the decision is made with cost parameters η(b0, a0, ã0) and at period
2, the decision is made with cost parameters η2(b0, a0, ã0), and so on. For the result, we
used η = 0.5
1
8 and ε = 1.5. The other parameters will be explained in subsection 2.6.2.
Table 1 lists the numerical results with the corresponding analytical values of the
slopes. As will be explained in Theorem 2.5.1, in this case, we can obtain the analytic
value of the slope for the boundary BUY/KEEP, but we do not have analytic expression
for the slope for the boundary KEEP/SELL. Thus, assuming that l1,U is given by the
numerical value, we calculate the slopes of upper bounds in the other periods. Even though
small difference between numerical results and analytical values exists, which results from
the discretization of the state space, these results validate the relationship between cost
25
parameters and the slopes.
Table 1: Values of the slopes with cost depreciation
Numerical Results Analytic Results
Period BUY/KEEP KEEP/SELL BUY/KEEP KEEP/SELL
1 0.1999 0.5847 0.2042 .
2 0.2314 0.6768 0.2325 0.6658
3 0.2678 0.7642 0.2648 0.7582
4 0.2953 0.8638 0.3015 0.8635
5 0.3418 1.0000 0.3433 0.9833
6 0.3957 1.1025 0.3910 1.1198
Remark 4. We use ηt = η for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T} and same cost depreciation rate to the
installation cost, the maintenance cost, and the salvage value. This use might be true if
the industry is stable and the corresponding industry indicator has upward trend with
small volatility. However, if the growth rate of the industry is not stable but very volatile,
ηt must be dependent on time.
2.4.2 Price Elasticity of Demand vs. the Values of the Slopes
Next, we study the effect of price elasticity of demand ε on the values of the slopes. The
effect of ε cannot be determined in general. Its effect is correlated with cost parameters.
Therefore, we can define several regions of cost parameters that provide different relation-
ship between the values of slopes and ε. The slopes of the boundaries for BUY/KEEP and


















Lemma 2.4.2. 1. If A(t) ≥ 1 and B(t) ≥ 1 are satisfied, then the slopes are increasing
functions with ε.
2. If A(t) ≥ 1 and B(t) ≥ 1 are not satisfied, then there exists a maximum point where








Given A(t) < 1, up to a point, which is given by g−1(A), the slope is increasing and
then is decreasing thereafter.






is the requited condition for the slopes to increase in the given range.
Proof. See the proof in section 2.7.
When we confine 1 ≤ ε ≤ 2.842, then A(t) ≥ 0.896 is satisfactory for the slopes to
increase with respect to ε.
Table 2 shows the numerical results of the relationship between the values of slopes
and ε. In our cost parameter set, A(t) > 1, so the results shows increasing trend only. For
the values of the parameters, refer to subsection 2.6.2.











2.4.3 Variance of the Economic Condition vs. the Values of the Slopes
In this section, we establish the relationship between the variance of the economic indicator
and the values of the slopes. In doing so, we explore the effects of variance in the economic
condition on the optimal capacity in two cases: with cost depreciation and with no cost
depreciation. As we addressed in the previous section, with cost depreciation, we can
2for this values for ε, refer to Lanning, Mitra, Wang, and Wright[25]
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delay our investment to take advantage of the reduced cost, but we should consider the
revenue loss due to inadequate capacity in the current period. Therefore, the firm should
decide the investment considering the trade off between cost depreciation and revenue and
the variance of the future economic condition at the same time.
























= 0.0506 v 0.1552
2.
a0 = 4 ã0 = 0.5 · a0 b0 = 0.15 · a0 η = 0.5
1
8 .
For the parameters used here, refer to subsection 2.6.2.
Table 3: Values of the slopes with a variance of economic indicator
Variance With cost depreciation Without cost depreciation
BUY/KEEP KEEP/SELL BUY/KEEP KEEP/SELL
0.0506 0.1897 0.5789 0.2445 0.6224
0.0768 0.1716 0.5919 0.2345 0.6673
0.1029 0.1587 0.5986 0.2187 0.7155
0.1290 0.1501 0.6121 0.2011 0.7461
0.1552 0.1403 0.6189 0.1902 0.7780













Using Theorem 2.3.1, which addresses the concavity of the value function, we can
explain the trend of the slopes with the variance of economic condition.
Under cost depreciation, the slope for the boundary BUY/KEEP has a smaller value for
the larger variance, and the slope for the boundary SELL/KEEP does not have deterministic
relationship with the variance of the economic indicator.
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As the variance of ξt+1 increases, function (2.4.1) is likely to decrease at x = x
∗
t,L. To
make up this change, the optimal capacity for BUY should shift to lower value. Therefore,
the investment decision becomes more conservative for the BUY case.
Value of function (2.4.1) at x = x∗t,U does not provide any clear trend with the variance
of economic indicator. Therefor, we can not determine the relationship between the opti-
mal capacity and the variance of economic indicator for the SELL case in general. In this
case, the relationship between the slopes of the boundary SELL/KEEP and the variance of
the economic indicator is determined by how steep the cost depreciation is and the third
derivative of the value function around the point (x∗t,U , ξt).
Under no cost depreciation, the slope for the boundary BUY/KEEP has a smaller value
for the larger variance and the slope for the boundary SELL/KEEP has a larger value for
the larger variance. In the BUY case, equation (2.4.1) has a lower value at x = x∗t,L and in
the SELL case, equation (2.4.1) has a higher value at x = x∗t,U . To make up these changes,
the optimal capacity for BUY and SELL should shift to a lower value and a higher value,
respectively. Therefore, as variance increases, the range of optimal capacity expands. In
other words, the KEEP region expands, which means the investment decision becomes
more conservative as the variance increases.
Figure 5 shows the derivatives of the value function. The left-hand side graph repre-
sents the case with cost depreciation and the right-hand side graph represents the case
without cost depreciation. With cost depreciation, the optimal lower and upper bounds
move to right with time, which explains the change of equation (2.4.1) with the variance of
the economic condition. Without cost depreciation, the optimal lower and upper bounds
stay at the same point, which also explains the change of equation (2.4.1) with the variance
of the economic condition accurately.
Remark 5. Table 3 shows that the no depreciation case has larger slope values for
BUY/KEEP. With cost depreciation, the firm can take advantage of the reduced cost when
it delay the investment. However, without cost depreciation, there is no cost reduction for
an investment in the next period, which leads the firm to invest this period to make more
29
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Figure 5: Derivative of value function with spline approximation
revenue. With cost depreciation, they want to sell more during this period to earn more
profits and interest from the higher salvage value in this period than the lowered salvage
value in the next period, which explains the smaller slope values for KEEP/SELL in the
case with cost depreciation.
2.5 Incremental Investment with Cost Depreciation
In the telecommunications market, even if the future economic condition is expected to
be bad, the use of bandwidth and the number of mobile phone subscribers might increase
due to the reduced market price, because of improvements in technology, which lower unit
costs. During the last few years, the economic condition has not improved all the time.
However, the number of mobile phone and Internet users has continued to increase. In
fact, according to the World Telecommunication Development Report [17], the number of
mobile phone and Internet users has increased very rapidly worldwide. The data show this
trend regardless of the economic condition. In addition, Kenyon and Cheliotis[21] stated
that the Internet and network bandwidth have had periods of 100% growth every three
or four months and during the past few years, the growth has slowed to 100% per year.
In this section, we investigate the causes of this trend in the market and the relation-
ships between this trend and the investment behavior of firms.
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At first, we examine the conditions under which incremental investment decisions are
made.
Theorem 2.5.1. Let us assume that the cost depreciates exponentially with time as bt+1 =
ηbt, at+1 = ηat, and ãt+1 = ηãt for all t, with η < 1. If η
ε ≤ ξt+1ξt with probability 1, then




e−r(1 − 1ε )
bt + at − e−rat+1
)ε
.
2. If the firm is in the BUY region in the current period, the firm will be in the BUY
region in the following period regardless of the future economic condition.
3. The investment decision of the current period is not dependent on the investment
decision of the following period.
Proof. The proof is in section 2.7.
Remark 6. Under this assumption:








at + bt − e−rat+1
)ε
ξt = At)ξt,
where A(t) is deterministic. Therefore, x∗t,L is a stochastic process that is directly
dependent on the movement of the general economic condition.
2. If ηε ≤ ξt+1ξt with probability 1 is true for all t, the investment decision in one period
is independent of the investment decision of the other periods. In this case, this
multiple-time investment problem can be reduced to a one-time period investment
problem.
3. The firm should increase capacity regardless of the future economic condition. In
the extreme case, even if the future economic condition is likely to be bad, the
firm still wants to buy. The increment is stochastic and is dependent only on the
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current economic condition. Therefore, the increment is small if the current economic
condition is bad and large if the current economic condition is good.
4. The driving force for buying comes from ε, the cost depreciation, and the economic
condition of the following period. To satisfy the assumption, we need small η, large
ε, and/or large ξt+1ξt for the worst case transition. Small η reduces the cost and forces
the firm to buy more capacity. If ε is large, then the revenue increases with a lower
price and increased capacity, and this effect accelerates with larger ε.
In the telecommunications market, technology improves very rapidly, which drives cost
reductions year after year. Let t 1
2
be the time period during which unit costs reduced to








From [20] and [21], we set the possible range of t1/2 between one and two years. From
[35], the traditional elasticity estimate for voice traffic is approximately 1.05 and for data
traffic, in the range of 1.3 - 1.7. Therefore,
0.7448 ≤ ηε ≤ 0.9130
Thus, if the worst possible transition of the general economic condition during one quarter
is more than −9.7%, then the assumption is satisfied.
Table 4 shows numerical results. For the parameters used here, refer to subsection 2.6.2.
We can separate the result into two cases: the first is when ηε < ξt+1ξt is satisfied, and the
other is when the condition is not satisfied.









• We can observe that the investment decision is independent of the future economic
condition. The values of the slope do not change with the probability of upward
movement.
• If the state is in the BUY region at period 1, then it is in the BUY region at period
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p=0 0.1566 0.1813 0.1999 0.2429 0.2204 0.1904
p=0.5 0.1566 0.1813 0.1999 0.2429 0.2678 0.2678
p=1 0.1566 0.1813 0.1999 0.2429 0.2812 0.3101
Analytic Value 0.1586 0.1849 0.2042 0.2462 . .
At Period 2
p=0 0.2099 0.2204 0.2314 0.2678 0.2314 0.1904
p=0.5 0.2099 0.2204 0.2314 0.2678 0.2812 0.2678
p=1 0.2099 0.2204 0.2314 0.2678 0.2812 0.3101
Analytic Value 0.2057 0.2199 0.2325 0.2628 . .
2, too, because l1,Lξ1 < l2,Lξ2 with the worst case of ξ2, which is ξ1(1 + ∆)
−1.
• In this case, the numerical result is compatible with analytic values with small
discretization error.
• The slopes of periods 1 and 2 are independent and can be calculated separately.
This independence will continue throughout the other periods.
2. η = (0.5)
1
32 or 1
• The investment decision is very sensitive to future economic conditions.
• For the case η = 1, no depreciation occurs and the slopes do not change with time.
The next two subsections will illustrate the actual movement of the optimal capacity
and the resulting price under the assumption that the cost reduction is steep enough to
satisfy ηε < ξt+1ξt for all possible transitions of the economic indicator.
2.5.1 Capacity Trend
Under the condition ηε < ξt+1ξt with probability 1 for all t, the capacity increment decisions
fall into one of the following three categories:







ξ1 at time 1 and continues to increase capacity. The decision depends
only on the realization of the uncertain economic condition with the deterministic
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coefficient. The optimal capacity at time t is
x∗t,L =
(
e−r(1 − 1ε )





e−r(1 − 1ε )
b1 + a1 − a2
)ε
ξt.
2. The company starts with a moderate capacity at time 0 and stays in the KEEP region
for a while. After some periods, it falls into the BUY region and keeps increasing
the capacity from period to period. The length of the time of staying in the KEEP
region depends on the actual movement of the economic indicator and the initial
capacity at time 0.
3. The company starts with too much capacity at time 0 but cuts the capacity to l1,Uξ1
at time 1 and stays in the KEEP region for a while. After some period, it falls into
the BUY region and continues to increase capacity from period to period. The length
in the KEEP region depends on the actual movement of the economic indicator.
Figure 6 shows the actual movement of capacity and the price when ηε < ξt+1ξt with
probability 1. The solid line represents the analytical value and the o represents numerical
results.
1. According to the first graph, the firm starts lower than the lower optimal capacity.
After one period, it jumps on the KEEP/BUY boundary and continues to follow the
optimal capacity trend.
2. According to the second graph, the firm starts with higher than the lower optimal
capacity but lower than upper optimal capacity. After the firm spends some periods
in KEEP regions, it gets on the KEEP/BUY boundary and continues to follow the
optimal capacity trend.
3. According to the third graph, the firm starts with more than the upper optimal
capacity. After the selling off the excess capacity at period 1, it goes into the KEEP
region. After going through several periods in KEEP region, the firm finally gets
onto the KEEP/BUY boundary and continues to follow the optimal capacity trend.
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2.5.2 Price Trend
Under the condition ηε < ξt+1ξt for all possible transitions of the economic indicator, we
can obtain a trajectory of the price. Employing x∗t,L as our market capacity, the price











e−r(1 − 1ε )






bt + at − e
−rat+1
e−r(1 − 1ε )
)
, (2.5.1)




bt + at − e
−rat+1
e−r(1 − 1ε )
)
= (η)k Pt. (2.5.2)
The important thing is this price trend does not depend on the realization of the
economic condition as contrast with the optimal capacity path which is dependent on the
realization of the uncertain economic condition.
Figure 6 shows the actual movement of capacity and the price when ηε < ξt+1ξt with
probability 1. After the capacity of a firm reaches the lower optimal capacity, the price
follows equation 2.5.2.
2.6 Numerical Studies
In this section, we want to illustrate how we set up our numerical analysis.
2.6.1 Numerical model
We consider the investment decision of a monopolistic firm with time horizon T .
The set of possible states of the capacity is S, and
St = {x1, x2, ..., xnt} with t = 0, 1, ..., T.
The set of possible states of the economic indicator is E, and
Et = {ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξmt} with t = 0, 1, ..., T.
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The number of possible states of the capacity and the economic indicator might depend
on the time period.
The set of cost parameters at time 0 is (b0, a0, ã0), which includes unit maintenance cost,
unit installation cost and unit salvage value at time 0. These cost parameters depreciate
with time, and the set of cost parameters at time t is (ηtb0, η
ta0, η
tã0), with 0 < η < 1.
The value function at time 1, given the capacity of the previous period (x0) and the
economic condition of the current period (ξ1), is















x0 ∈ S0, xi ∈ S1 , and ξ1 ∈ E1,
with
VT (xT−1, ξT ) = FT (xT−1, ξT ).
We solve for the optimal capacity at time 1, given all possible pairs of (x0, ξ1). Therefore,
we consider all the possible kinds of firms, from the emerging company to the over-invested
company and all the possible economic conditions.
Here, we need to define the transition probability





pt(i, j) = 1 for all i.
To solve this problem, we use dynamic programming.
1. First, set the terminal value function FT (xT−1, ξT ). With a large enough T ,
FT (xT−1, ξT ) can be any simple function.
2. Then go back one period to T − 1, and for every possible pair of (xT−2, ξT−1),
calculate









bT−1xT−1 + aT−1(xT−1 − xT−2)+




FT (xT−1, ξT |ξT−1)
]
with xT−1 ∈ ST−1.
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3. Choose x∗T−1 that maximize Ṽ (xT−2, xT−1, ξT−1) and set
V (xT−2, ξT−1) = Ṽ (xT−2, x
∗
T−1, ξT−1).
4. After calculating all the value functions for all the possible states, {(xT−2, ξT−1) :
xT−2 ∈ ST−2 and ξT−1 ∈ ET−1}, go back one period to T − 2.
5. Do the same calculation (2-4) until all the value functions for all the possible states
at time 1 are found.
2.6.2 Numerical Example
The following set represents the parameter values that are used for our numerical results.
1. Time period and finite time horizon (T): in our model, one period corresponds to
one quarter (3 months), and we set T = 40, which corresponds to ten years.
2. Expected return during a period: we expect a 2.5% return in a period and use the
compounded return rate.
3. The possible states of capacity:
S(t) = {x0(1 + ∆)
i : i = −50,−49, ..., 0, 1, ..., 50, ∆ = 0.05 and x0 = 1}
With ∆ = 0.05, the minimum increment is 5% and decrement is 4.8% of the current
capacity. This capacity set covers a very broad range of investment decisions. If we
start with x0 capacity, the possible investment increases to x0(1.05)
50 = 11.46 · x0
and decreases to x0(1.05)
−50 = 0.0872 · x0. The number of possible states is 101 for
all t.
4. The possible states of the economic indicator:
E(t) = {ξ0(1 + ∆)
i : i = −n(t),−n(t) + 1, ...n(t), ∆ = 0.05 and ξ0 = 1},
where n(t) = 50 + 2 · t. The number of possible economic conditions increases with
time.
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5. The transition probabilities:
pt(i, j) = P
{
ξt+1 = (1 + ∆)







p if j = i + 1,
1 − p if j = i − 1.
We allow for two possible transitions (up and down). The expected return of the











= (1 + ∆)p + (1 + ∆)−1q.
6. We set the maintenance cost, installation cost, and the salvage value at time 0 as






, b0 = 0.15a0, and ã0 = 0.5a0.
In our numerical model, one period corresponds to one quarter. By setting a0 =
4P0, the revenue of a firm in a year from an additional capacity is the same as
the installation cost for the additional capacity. By b0 = 0.15a0, we assume the
maintenance teams/companies charge 5% of the installation cost as their monthly
maintenance fee. By ã0 = 0.5a0, we assume that the salvage value of the capacity is
the half of the purchase price.
7. We consider constant cost depreciation with time as
(bt, at, ãt) = η
t(b0, a0, ã0) for all t,
and we set η = 0.5
1
8 , as we discussed before.
With this parameter set, Figures 6 and 7 show the numerical results. Figure 6 shows
the actual movement of capacity and price. Figure 7 shows the average movement of
capacity and price when p = 0.5. The first, second, and third rows correspond to cases 1,
2 and 3, in subsection 2.5.1 respectively. The only difference among them is the starting
point. When the company starts with a small capacity (case 1), it will increase to the
lower optimal capacity (x∗1,L) at time 1 and continues to increase. When the company
starts with a moderate capacity (case 2), it will stay in the KEEP region for a while and
then fall into the BUY region, and continues to increase. When the company starts with



























1 2 3 4












































1 2 3 4













































1 2 3 4





















Figure 6: Actual movement of price and capacity when ηε < ξt+1ξt with probability 1
at time 1, stay in the KEEP region for a while, fall into the BUY region, and continues to
increase.
Tables 5 and 6 are the analytic representation of the movement of capacity and price.
For each case, we consider three different scenarios:
1. p = 0.5: the probabilities that the movement of the economic condition in any
direction are equal.
2. p = 1.0: the probability of upward movement of the economic condition is 1; there-
fore, we expect the economic condition to improve during the following period by
∆, 5%. This corresponds to the upper rim of the triangle in Figure 6.
3. p = 0.0: the probability of downward movement of the economic condition is 1;
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Figure 7: Average Movement of Price and Capacity when ηε < ξt+1ξt with Probability 1
therefore, we expect the economic condition to deteriorate during the following pe-





e−r(1 − 1ε )




b0 + a0 − e
−rηa0
e−r(1 − 1ε )
)
.
Notice that in all scenarios, the form of the analytical solution for the capacity in
Table 5 is the same, but the real movement, which is illustrated in Figure 6 depends on
the movement of the economic condition. This applies to the price movement with the
same manner in Figure 6. However, for the price movement, after the firm falls into the
BUY region, the price does not depend on the economic condition. The price is fixed to
Bηt once the firm hits the KEEP/BUY boundary.
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When we consider investment decision problem of a matured firm, the firm is likely
to be in the BUY region and continue to increase its capacity. Therefore, the capacity
movement will be pictured by the first row of the Figure 6, and the analytic expression
will be the same as the first column of Table 5.
Table 5: Capacity movement with economic indicator and probability of upward move-
ment
Case 1(BUY) Case 2(KEEP) Case 3(SELL)









































































































Table 6: Price movement with economic indicator and probability of upward movement
Case 1(BUY) Case 2 & 3(KEEP, SELL)
p = 0.5 Pt = B · η







p = 1.0 Pt = B · η















p = 0.0 Pt = B · η















Proof of Theorem 2.3.1. If Vt+1 (xt, ξt+1) is a concave function with respect to xt, then










First, the value function is










































For all xt−1 that is less than x
∗
t,L, the optimal solution is x
∗
t,L. From the above
equation, we can see that smaller given capacity induces a larger investment cost.






























For all xt−1 that is greater than x
∗
t,U , the optimal solution is x
∗
t,U . From the above
equation, we can see a larger given capacity leads a larger salvage revenue. Therefore,










































In this case, if Vt+1 (xt−1, ξt+1) is concave with respect to xt−1, then Vt(xt−1, ξt) is
concave, because the sum of the concave functions is concave.













< ãt at some point xt−1, which is less than x
∗
t,U ), then x
∗
t,U cannot be the









= ãt and this
is similarly applied to x∗t,L.
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Proof of Theorem 2.5.1. Let us assume that cost depreciates as bt+1 = ηbt, at+1 = ηat, ãt+1 =
ηãt for all t, then the optimal capacity is given by
xt,L = lt,Lξt
xt+1,L = lt+1,Lξt+1 = η
−εlt,Lξt+1
xt+2,L = lt+2,Lξt+2 = η
−2εlt,Lξt+2 (2.7.1)
...etc.
Here we used Theorem 2.3.4 of the linearity between the optimal capacity and economic
condition and Lemma 2.4.1 of the relationship between the optimal capacity and scaler of
cost parameters. This equation (2.7.1) satisfies regardless of the economic condition.
In order to satisfy xt+1,L ≥ xt,L,
η−εlt,Lξt+1 ≥ lt,Lξt
η−εξt+1 ≥ ξt. (2.7.2)
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If equation (2.7.2) is satisfied for the worst economic condition at t + 1, it is satisfied
for all possible economic conditions of next period, ξt+1.




with probability 1, (2.7.3)
the company will increase the capacity position to lt+1,Lξt+1(= η
−εlt,Lξt+1) regardless of
the future economic conditions ξt+2.
Next, we want to prove that under condition (2.7.3) , the slope of the boundary between








Proof. As we have just shown, under condition (2.7.3), the company will be in the BUY
region at time t + 1. Therefore, the value function for BUY at time t is













































































p(ξt, ξt+1,i)at+1 = 0.
Therefore, the lower optimal bound is
x∗t,L =
(
e−r(1 − 1ε )
bt + at − e−rat+1
)ε
ξt.
















































then dg(ε)dε > 0, and limε↑∞ g(ε) = 1.
Therefore,
1. If A ≥ 1 is satisfied, then f(ε) is an increasing function with ε.
2. If A ≥ 1 is not satisfied, f(ε) increases until ε reaches to g−1(A(t)) and then decreases
thereafter, where g−1 is the inverse function of g.
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CHAPTER III
THE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF A FIRM IN AN
OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET
In this section, we consider the capacity investment problem in an oligopolistic market.
The International Telecommunication Union presented how reform from a public, mo-
nopolistic industry to a private, competitive market is taking place all over the world
in the World Telecommunication Development Report, 2002. Eric Lie (2002) illustrated
trends in telecommunication competition and gave guidelines for the telecommunication
regulation and competition law. We want to support their work and assist with efforts to
establish better guidelines by providing the firms’ investment behavior in the competitive
market. We find out if there exists an equilibrium point between firms’ investment deci-
sions at a given economic condition and prove the uniqueness of this equilibrium point.
In addition, we study how the investment behavior of monopolistic firms changes when
there are competitors in the market by investigating how firms in a market respond to the
existence of the other firms. How competition affects the market properties is illustrated
by exploring the relationship between the number of firms in the market and total market
capacity, market price, consumer surplus, expected time to a certain price reduction and
the expected time to the first investment decision.
Competition between firms in a non-cooperative competitive market can be modeled
in three traditional ways: the Cournot model, the Bertrand model and the Stackelberg
model. The main assumption of the Cournot model is that each firm in the market treats
the output of other firms as a fixed number that will not respond to its own production
decisions. The Bertrand model proposes that each firm chooses its price on the assump-
tion that the prices of its competitors will remain fixed. In the Stackelberg model, one
firm assumes that the rival is a naive Cournot duopolist. In our case, the Cournot and
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the Bertrand models procuce the same results, because the price is a function of demand
scaled by the general economic condition. In addition, we treat the firms in the market
equally. In other words, one firm cannot be superior to another in solving the invest-
ment problem. Therefore, among these three models, we choose the Cournot model to
formulate and solve the investment decision problem. In addition, we are interested in
the market structure where big players act simultaneously rather than sequentially. In a
telecommunications industry, a firm’s market share is important and firms in this industry
more likely to choose investment strategies simultaneously rather than sequentially. The
Cournot model is appropriate to study such a simultaneous investment decision between
firms in a competitive market, which leads us to adopt the Cournot model to investigate
the investment decision of a firm in an oligopolistic market.
A considerable number of studies have used the Cournot model to explain market
behavior. One interesting application of the Cournot game is the decision making of
information sharing. Li [27] investigated the equilibrium behavior of firms in exchange
of their information in a Cournot oligopoly. It showed that (1) if there is uncertainty
about a common parameter, referred to as “ the true state of the world,” no information
sharing between firms is the unique Nash equilibrium; (2) if there is uncertainty about
a firm-specific parameter (in this case, the constant marginal cost coefficient), complete
information sharing is dominant over no information sharing. Kamien[18] introduced
an interesting cake division game equivalent to the Cournot game. Using each player’s
reaction function, it showed equivalence between the cake division game and the Cournot
game in several situations, specifically when the algebra to achieve an equilibrium in the
Cournot game is complicated. Wen and David[43] used the Cournot oligopoly model to
determine the equilibrium state of the electricity market. They introduced uncertainty into
the information about the cost functions of competitors. They modeled this incomplete
information in three cases: an estimated cost function, several estimated cost functions
with probabilities for each estimate and an estimated distribution of a cost function for
each of the other players. In addition, by providing an example for each case, they showed
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how market price, total output, and total payoff change. Maiorano, Song, and Trovato[30]
used the Cournot model to explain the behavior of supplies in the electricity market.
They focused on the effect of one firm’s decision on other firms’ profits by showing the
best response curve of a firm with respect to other firms’ actions. Grenadier[14] used the
Cournot-Nash framework and the real option approach to derive equilibrium investment
strategies. He addressed the lack of strategic interaction across option holders in the pre-
existing literature and showed the value of waiting for the investment to converge to zero
as the number of players in the market increases. In this case, the traditional NPV rule
becomes approximately correct even for industries with a few competitors.
The Cournot equilibrium can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.0.1. We consider a market for a single homogeneous goods with inverse



























for all x ≥ 0, for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
The Nash equilibrium can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.0.2. If there is a set of strategies with the property that no player can benefit
by changing his or her strategy while the other players do not change their strategies, then
that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute the Nash Equilibrium.
From the above definitions, we know that if an optimal point is a Cournot equilibrium
point, then the point is also a Nash Equilibrium point.
3.1 Problem Formulation in An Oligopolistic Market
In addition to the monopoly case, we study the problem of multi-period investments under
an uncertain general economic condition in an oligopolistic market. In this section, we
extend the monopolistic investment model to an oligopolistic investment model starting
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with the general formulation of the problem in an oligopolistic market. The oligopolistic
market is assumed to be non-cooperatively competitive. We apply the Cournot model of
oligopolistic behavior to find an optimal strategy for each firm in the market which has
N firms in it.
At the beginning of each period, each firm makes an investment decision based on
its capacity of previous period, the current economic condition, and the expectations of
investment decisions of other firms.
We assume each firm shares all information with other firms, which includes the pre-
vious period capacities and cost structures of other firms and expectations for the future
economic condition. In addition, we assume that all the firms follow the Cournot behavior
for investment decisions.
At the beginning of period t:
1. Firm i has xi,t−1 capacity and knows the current economic condition ξt and the
previous period capacities of other firms, ~X−i,t−1, where ~X−i,t−1 is a vector which
is defined by (x1,t, x2,t, ..., xi−1,t, xi+1,t, ..., xN,t).
2. Firm i has to decide the optimal investment quantity x̂i,t, then x
∗
i,t(= x̂i,t + xi,t−1),
which will continue from the beginning to the end of period t.
3. The firm i’s cost parameter is given by (bi,t, ai,t, ãi,t) and the cost occurring in period
t is bi,txi,t + ai,t(xi,t − xi,t−1)+ − ãi,t(xi,t−1 − xi,t)+.






, where x−i,t =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i xj . Therefore,
(xi,t + x−i,t) is the total market capacity.
5. The temporary value function of a firm i is given by


















i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N.
49
6. The optimal value function of a firm i is given by






























i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N.
Notice that Ṽi,t and Vi,t differ. To get the optimal value function for each firm, we
first need to define the temporary value function for each firm. By solving for x∗i,t that
maximizes Ṽi,t for all i, we can find a optimal capacity vector whose component is the






N,t). Then we substitute this optimal
capacity vector ~X∗t to the temporary value function to get an optimal value function. In
ordet to find the Cournot equilibrium point in the N -dimensional space, given the previous
period capacity of each firm, we need to maximize the temporary value function of each
firm simultaneously by using the iteration method referred as the “Round Robin Method”
and the procedure of which follows:
1. We choose any value, say zero, of the terminal value function Fi,T (xi,T−1, ~X−i,T−1, ξT )
for i = 1, 2, ...N .
2. At time T − 1, given (x1,T−2, x2,T−2, ..., xn,T−2, ξT−1), we start to determine the
optimal capacity x∗1,T−1 of firm 1 as follows:
(a) we choose any initial capacity vector ~X−1,T−1 ≡ (x2,T−1, x3,T−1, ..., xn,T−1),
(b) solve the temporary value function Ṽ1,T−1 with the initial vector ~X−1,T−1 and
get a temporary optimal capacity x̃∗1,T−1.
Update ~XT−1 = (x̃
∗
1,T−1, x2,T−1, ..., xn,T−1),
(c) solve the temporary value function Ṽ2,T−1 with the updated ~X−2,T−1 and get a






(d) solve the temporary value function Ṽi,T−1 for i = 3, 4, ..., n until we have all
updated values for ~XT−1.
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3. (2) We continue to iterate from (a) to (d) until we find an equilibrium point using
the updated ~XT−1 at each time.
4. Finally we get {Vi,T−1(xi,T−2, ~X−i,T−2, ξT−1), i = 1, 2, ..., N} from







n,T−1) for one given state (
~XT−2, ξT−1).
5. We do the same thing (2-4) for the entire (N +1)-dimensional capacity and economic
condition space.
6. We go one period back to T − 2 and start loops (2-5) until we find the vector of
optimal capacities, ~X∗T−2, for all possible states of (
~XT−3, ξT−2).
7. We do loops (2-5) until we return to period 1 and obtain the vector of optimal
capacities ~X∗1 , for all possible states of (
~X0, ξ1).
If we have m1 possible states for the capacity for each firm and m2 possible states for the
economic condition, we need to do the loop (2-4) Nm1 ·m2 times for one period calculation.
Therefore, regardless of the rate of convergence from the temporary value function to the
optimal value function, the calculation time would be huge.
In our proposed model, the cost function is not differentiable. Some other papers
assume that the cost function is differentiable, which leads to this heavy calculation. In
this case, the problem is reduced to finding a solution of a set of differentiable equations,
and the resulting path does not show the KEEP region.
To reduce this calculation load, we first investigate the structure of the solution. By
taking advantage of the structure of the solution, we can save considerable calculation
time.
3.2 Modeling Assumptions
We assume the following throughout the analysis under oligopolistic market structure in
chapter 3 and the experimental analysis in chapter 4.
1. The oligopolistic market is non-cooperatively competitive.
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2. Each firm shares all information with other firms, which includes the previous period
capacities and cost structures of other firms and expectations for the future economic
condition.
3. The price elasticity of demand, ε, is constant, and ε > 1.
4. We assume that the market demand is the same as the total of the capacity levels
of all firms in the market.
5. bi,t ≥ bi,t+1, ai,t ≥ ai,t+1, and ãi,t ≥ ãi,t+1, which reflects cost depreciation of firm i
due to improvements of technology.
6. ηt is the cost depreciation coefficient at time t with ηt < 1. In addition, all firms
have the same cost depreciation structure. Maintenance cost, installation cost, and
salvage value depreciate at the same rate as
(bi,t+1, ai,t+1, ãi,t+1) = ηt(bi,t, ai,t, ãi,t) with ηt < 1 for all t and all i.





is a concave function with respect to xi,T−1 for all i, which guar-















With this assumption, the linearity between the optimal capacity and the economic
condition is established.
9. All firms have the same cost parameters in the symmetric case. Namely
(bi,t, ai,t, ãi,t) = (bt, at, ãt) for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Each firm can have different cost parameters in the asymmetric case.
(bi,t, ai,t, ãi,t) 6= (bj,t, aj,t, ãj,t) for all different pair of i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
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10. We allow each firm to have different capacity in the previous period.
xi,t−1 6= xj,t−1 for all different pair of i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
3.3 General Structure of the Solution
Similarly to the monopoly case, we can define the value function at every period as a
vector. Each component of the vector is the optimal value function of each firm:
~Vt(x1,t−1, x2,t−1, ..., xn,t−1, ξt) =
(
V1,t(x1,t−1, x−1,t−1, ξt), ..., VN,t(xN,t−1, x−N,t−1, ξt)
)
.
The component of this vector corresponds to each firm’s optimal value function. In other
words, we have already found the optimal capacity expansion for all firms at time t and
obtained the optimal capacity trajectory from time t − 1 to t.
As we can see from the above vector of value functions, we need to find the solution
given the information of the previous period. Given the capacities of all other firms in the
previous period , a firm needs to decide the optimal capacity of the current period based
on its capacity of previous period and the economic condition.
Using this vector of optimal capacity of each firm, we investigate if the solution struc-
ture of the monopolistic case still applies to the oligopolistic case.
 Linear relationship between firms’ optimal capacities and the economic condition.
As we illustrated in Theorem 2.3.4, economic condition and both the optimal lower and
optimal upper bounds have a linear relationship in the case of monopolistic market. This
theorem can be extended to the case of N firms in an oligopolistic market with a minor
change in the proof.
Corollary 3.3.1. For t = 1, ..., T , suppose ~Vt+1(x1,t, x2,t, ..., xN,t, ξt+1) is homogeneous,
i.e., ∀η > 0,
~Vt+1(ηx1,t, ηx2,t, ..., ηxN,t, ηξt+1)
= (V1,t+1(ηx1,t, ηξt+1), V2,t+1(ηx2,t, ηξt+1), ..., VN,t+1(ηxN,t, ηξt+1))
= (ηV1,t+1(x1,t, ξt+1), ηV2,t+1(x2,t, ξt+1), ..., ηVN,t+1(xN,t, ξt+1))
= ηVt+1(x1,t, x2,t, ..., xN,t, ξt+1).
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Then













2. Furthermore, ~Vt(x1,t−1, x2,t−1, ..., xN,t−1, ξt) is also homogeneous.
Proof. See the proof in section 3.6.
From Corollary 3.3.1, we know that a linear relationship between the economic con-
dition and the optimal capacity is still satisfied in the case of N firms. When we scale
the given capacities and the economic condition, the resulting optimal capacity for each
company is scaled. Using this characteristic, we can reduce one dimension in our calcu-
lation. After getting solutions for a particular value of the current economic condition
with all possible capacity vectors of the previous period, we can get a solution for the
entire state space. Figure 8 shows one possible solution when we consider two firms in the
market assuming a very simple solution. As we can see in Figure 8, once we have optimal
capacity vectors for one fixed economic condition, we can get optimal capacity vectors for
any other economic condition. The inside of the square cone is the (KEEP, KEEP) region
for firms 1 and 2.
 The relationship between firms optimal capacities and the cost parameters.
Corollary 3.3.2. If the vector of optimal capacities of firms with the cost parameters
(bi,t, ai,t, ãi,t) is ~X
∗
t , then for ∀η > 0, the vector of optimal capacities of firms for the cost
parameters (ηbi,t, ηai,t, ηãi,t) is η
−ε ~X∗t
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.4.1.
3.4 Symmetric Firms in an Oligopolistic Market
In order to find the optimal investment strategy, we need to prove the existence of an
equilibrium point beforehand. William [37] provided some general conditions for the
existence of the equilibrium in the Cournot model. Long[28] provided sufficient conditions
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for the existence and the uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium by applying the contraction
mapping approach. However, the conditions in there two papers, specifically P (xt) = 0
for some value of xt, do not match those of our model. Thus we try to find the equilibrium
point and prove its uniqueness in our model.
First, we study the investment decisions of a firm in an oligopolistic market when the
firms in the market have same cost structures. For any firm i, the cost occurring at time
t is
Ci,t(xi,t−1, xi,t) = bi,txi,t + ai,t(xi,t − xi,t−1)+ − ãi,t(xi,t−1 − xi,t)+,
where (bi,t, ai,t, ãi,t) = (bt, at, ãt) for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
However, we allow each firm to have different capacity of the previous period. Therefore,
at time t, we allow xi,t−1 6= xj,t−1 for all different pair of i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
In the next subsections, we will investigate the existence and the uniqueness of the
equilibrium point. In subsection 3.4.1, we will consider a duopoly market and we will
extend the results of it to the case of N symmetric firms in subsection 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Two Symmetric Firms in a Duopoly Market
In this subsection, we consider two symmetric firms in a duopoly market. Similar to those
in the monopoly case, the possible decisions for each company are BUY, KEEP and SELL.
Therefore, with two companies in the market, nine different decisions are possible. We
will study the existence of optimal capacity and the uniqueness of the solution for each
case. First, we explain the notations that will be used throughout this chapter. x∗i,AB is
the optimal capacity of firm i when firm 1 is in the A region and firm 2 is in the B region.
For example, x∗1,BB is the optimal solution of firm 1 when firm 1 is in the BUY region and
firm 2 is in the BUY region. To make the notation simple, we ignore period subscript (t)
and this can be well understood in the context.
Before starting to prove the existence and uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium point,
we define the Gi,b and Gi,s functions as a derivative of the temporary value functions of
firm i for each case of BUY and SELL.
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The temporary value function and the corresponding Gi,b function of company i at
time t for the BUY case are

















for i ∈ {1, 2}, and






















for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The temporary value function and the corresponding Gi,s function of company i at
time t for the SELL case are
















for i ∈ {1, 2}, and






















for i ∈ {1, 2}.




1,BB)) be the solution of a system of equations,
{Gi,b(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) = 0, i = 1, 2}. If x1,t−1 ≤ x
∗
1,BB and x2,t−1 ≤ x
∗
2,BB, then both
firms 1 and 2 increase their capacity to x∗1,BB and x
∗
2,BB, respectively.















































2,BB, ξt) ' −bt − at + e
−rãt+1 < 0,
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where we used Proposition 2.3.3 that will be used to prove the existence of the












< 0 for i ∈ {1, 2},
and therefore, Gi,b is a monotonically decreasing function with respect to xi,t.





























fore, G1,b(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) is a monotonically decreasing function in x1,t. In addition,
dG2,b(x1,t,x2,t,ξt)
dx2,t
< 0 with the same calculation. Hence, (x∗1,BB, x
∗
2,BB) is a unique
solution for the (BUY, BUY) case.




1,SS)) be the solution of a system of equations,
{Gi,s(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) = 0, i = 1, 2}. If x1,t−1 ≥ x
∗
1,SS and x2,t−1 ≥ x
∗
2,SS, then both of
firms 1 and 2 reduce their capacity to x∗1,SS and x
∗
2,SS, respectively.















































2,SS, ξt) ' −bt − ãt + e
−rãt+1 < 0.
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Therefore, there is a solution (x∗1,SS, x
∗








< 0 for i ∈ {1, 2} guarantees the uniqueness of the solution.
3. (SELL, BUY): Let (x∗1,SB, x
∗
2,SB) be the solution for a system of equations,
{G1,s(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) = 0, G2,b(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) = 0}. If x1,t−1 ≥ x
∗
1,SB and x2,t−1 ≤ x
∗
2,SB,
then firm 1 sells off the excess capacity down to x∗1,SB and firm 2 buys more capacity
up to x∗2,SB.
 Existence:
From the symmetry of the two firms, we know x∗1,SB > x
∗
2,SB.































want it to be
0.
(2) limx1,t↑∞ G1,s = −bt − ãt + e
−rãt+1 < 0.










− bt − at + e
−rat+1 >︸︷︷︸
want it to be
0.































want it to be
0.
The positivity of equation (1) comes from the fact that G1,s is a decreasing function













not an optimal point for the (SELL, SELL) case.
The negativity of equation (4)comes from the fact that G2,b is a decreasing function













not an optimal point for the (BUY, BUY) case.








The right-hand side of equation 3.4.2 is the limiting value of the total market capacity
when all firms in the market are in the BUY region1. Therefore, in order for firm 2
to be viable, the competitive output of firm 1 must not exceed the limiting value of
the total market capacity when all firms in the market are in the BUY region.
















monopolistic firm’s optimal capacity in the BUY case.
.
Hence, if the competitive output of firm 1 does not exceed the monopolistic firm’s
optimal capacity in the BUY case, then firm 2 is viable, . If x1,t does not satisfy
equation (3.4.2), then x2,t = 0 and the problem goes back to the monopolistic case.
The implication of this inequality is that, if the optimal capacity of firm 1 is very
large, then it is not profitable firm 2 to either enter or stay in the market. In addition,
if the cost coefficients of firms are small, the right-hand side of equality 3.4.2 tends
to be large, and the equality 3.4.2 has more possibility to satisfy. Therefore, we
conclude that in an duopolistic market, firms are more likely to survive with efficient






< 0 guarantee the uniqueness of the solution.




2,BB), as x1,t−1 increases be-
yond x∗1,BB, firm 1 goes into the KEEP region. The optimal capacity in this region is
(x∗1,t, x
∗






2,KB). Therefore, if x2,t−1 < x
∗
2,KB, then firm
2 buys more capacity up to x∗2,KB and firm 1 maintains its current capacity with

























2,BB) is not an
1Refer to subsection 3.4.3 to get this limiting value of the total market capacity when all firms in the
market are in the BUY region
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optimal solution for the (BUY, BUY) case.










− bt − at + e
−rat+1 >︸︷︷︸
want it to be
0.



































bt + at − e−rat+1
)ε
ξt. (3.4.2)
This is the same condition for the existence condition for the (SELL, BUY) case;
thus, if there is a solution for the case of (BUY, BUY), then there is a solution for
the case of (SELL, BUY). If x∗1,KB does not satisfy equation(3.4.2), then x2,t = 0 and
the problem goes back to the monopolistic case. In addition, the solution starts at
the point, (x∗1,BB, x
∗





The negativity of equation (2) comes from the fact that



























< 0 guarantees the uniqueness of the solution.
 Shape:
The shape of the (KEEP, BUY) line, which starts at (x∗1,BB, x
∗





2Refer to Figure 9 for more accurate understanding
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with probability 1, (3.4.3)
we can determine how x∗2,KB behaves as x
∗
1,KB increases from x
∗
1,BB.






Proof. The optimal solution (x∗1,KB, x
∗

































































































which is always negative in the (KEEP, BUY) case, because x∗1,KB > x
∗
2,KB.




























which is always negative.










2,BB). From this point, if firm
1 increases capacity, firm 2 cannot buy much capacity, which might be disadvanta-
geous to both firms. Therefore, the optimal capacity for firm 2 is less than x∗2,BB. In
this case, the total market capacity is more than 2 · x∗2,BB because equation (3.4.6)
> −1.
Combining with the implication of equation 3.4.2 in the case of (SELL, BUY), we
can explain the implication of the shape of the line of (KEEP, BUY). If firm 2 has a
very big amount of capacity, then firm 1 cannot enter the market. However, as the
amount of capacity of firm 2 decreases, firm 1 can enter the market and increases
its capacity.




2,SS), as x2,t−1 decreases









2,SK). Therefore, if x1,t−1 > x
∗
1,SK, then firm
1 sells the excess capacity down to x∗1,SK and firm 2 maintains current capacity with

























2,SS) is not an optimal
solution for the (SELL, SELL) case.































want it to be
0,
(2) limx1,t↑∞ G1,s = −bt − ãt + e
−rãt+1 < 0.
The positivity of equation (1) comes from the fact that




























< 0 guarantees the uniqueness of the solution.
6. (BUY, SELL): Same as the case of (SELL, BUY) by exchanging firm 1 with firm 2.
7. (BUY, KEEP): Same as the case of (KEEP, BUY)by exchanging firm 1 with firm 2.
8. (KEEP, SELL): Same as the case of (SELL, KEEP) by exchanging firm 1 with firm 2.
Figure 9 illustrates a solution of the case of two symmetric firms with a fixed economic
condition. As explained in Lemma 3.4.2, the line for the (KEEP, BUY) shows decreasing
trend as x1,t−1(= x
∗
1,KB) increases. In addition, the line for the (KEEP, BUY) shows
concavity, but some discretization error exists. This graph corresponds to the horizontal
plain in Figure 8.
3.4.2 N Symmetric Firms in an Oligopolistic Market
In this subsection, we want to investigate the investment behavior of a firm when more
than two firms occupy the market and study the existence of the Cournot equilibrium
point and the uniqueness of the point. Let N be the number of firms in the market.
Then for each firm i, three different investment decisions, BUY, KEEP, and SELL, can be
reached, depending on the decision of other firms and the general economic condition.
Again, we consider BUY, KEEP, and SELL cases for a firm separately.
1. (BUY): Let x∗i,B be the solution for Gi,b(xi,t,
~X−i,t, ξt) = 0 given ~X−i,t. If xi,t−1 ≤ x
∗
i,B,














− bt − at + e
−rat+1 >︸︷︷︸




Gi,b(xi,t, ~X−i,t, ξt) ' −bt − at + e
−rãt+1 < 0.
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bt + at − e−rat+1
)ε
ξt. (3.4.8)
The right side of the inequality is the limiting value of total market capacity when
all N firms are in the BUY region3.
Therefore, if all the firms are in the BUY region, there is a solution for firm i. If it
does not satisfy the inequality, then xi,t = 0, and we have to solve the problem again
with N − 1 firms. The implication of this inequality is that, if the total capacity of
other firms is very large, then it is not profitable for firm i to either enter or stay in
the market. In addition, if the cost parameters of firms are very small, then firm i can
enter the market very easily. Therefore, we conclude that in an oligopolistic market,
firms are more likely to survive with efficient cost structure than with inefficient cost
structure.
2. (SELL): Let x∗i,S be the solution for Gi,s(xi,t, x−i,t, ξt) = 0 given x−i,t. If xi,t−1 ≥ x
∗
i,S,














− bt − ãt + e
−rat+1 >︸︷︷︸




Gi,s(xi,t, ~X−i,t, ξt) ' −bt − ãt + e
−rãt+1 < 0.
In order for limxi,t↓0 Gi,s(xi,t,





max(bt + ãt − e−rat+1, 0+)
)ε
ξt.
The right-hand side of this equality is larger than that of equality 3.4.8. Therefore,
if there is a solution for the (BUY) case, the solution for the (SELL) case exists. In
addition, the right side of the inequality is the limiting value of the upper bound for
3Refer to subsection 3.4.3 to get the total market capacity when all N firms are in the BUY region.
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the total market capacity with all N firms. Therefore, the SELL case always has a
solution.
3. (KEEP): x∗i,K = xi,t−1 with x
∗
i,B < xi,t−1 < x
∗
i,S.
3.4.3 The Effect of Competition on Market Properties with Cost Deprecia-
tion
As in the monopolistic case, we consider incremental investment with cost depreciation.
Using the linear relationship between the optimal capacity at each period and the economic
condition, we can write
x∗i,t,L = li,t,Lξt for all t and for all i.
Here x∗i,t,L is the lower optimal capacity of the firm i at time t, li,t,L is the slope of the
boundary of KEEP/BUY, and ξt is the economic condition at time t.
By assuming that cost depreciates exponentially with constant cost depreciation factor
η as
(bt, at, ãt) = η(bt−1, at−1, ãt−1) with η < 1,








with probability 1. (3.4.9)
Under this condition, we have x∗i,t+1,L > x
∗
i,t,L.
Using this condition for the incremental investment, the Gi,b function changes to





















By setting Gi,b = 0 for all i, we obtain the analytic expression of the lower optimal capacity
and the slope, which are
x∗1,t,L = x
∗





































Remark 7. The sufficient condition for the incremental investment (equation (3.4.9)) is
irrelevant to the number of firms in the market.
Under the condition ηε < ξt+1ξt with probability 1, we can investigate the effect of
competition on the market properties.
 Total market capacity vs. the number of firms in the market.

















ξt, with N firms in the market.
The total market capacity at time t is
N∑
i=1























bt + at − e−rat+1
)ε
ξt.
As the above equation shows, we can see the competition causes the total market capacity
to increase.
We can compare the optimal capacity of a firm in a duopoly market with that in a

















bt + at − e−rat+1
)ε
ξt,
Therefore, the total capacity in a duopoly market is more than double of that in a mo-
nopolistic market.
In addition, we obtain the limiting value of total market capacity.
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As N ↑ ∞, the total capacity in the market is
∞∑
i=1








































optimal capacity of monopolistic firm
.
As the number of firms in the market increases, the total market capacity increases
up to the limiting point. With a small number of firms in the market, the total market
capacity almost reaches this limiting value. Therefore, adding more firms to the market
does not significantly change market property when several firms are already in the mar-








ranges from e (=2.7183 approximately) to ∞ as ε goes from 1 to ∞. With our




ranges from 3.4304 to 6.9963.
In Figure 10, the graph at the upper right-hand corner illustrates the relationship
between market capacity and the number of firms in the market with a limiting value.
Notice that a dramatic change occurs when a monopolistic market changes to a duopoly
market.  Market price vs. number of firms in the market.













r(bt + at − e
−rat+1).
As N increases, the total market capacity increases. The corresponding market price
decreases and the limiting value for the market price depends on neither ε nor the number
of firms in the market. In addition, the price depreciation trend of the price is the same
as the depreciation trend of the cost. If the trend of the price is different from that of the
cost, the firms in the market either take the huge price advantage or shut down their firm
because the price might be lower than the cost. Therefore, the market price and the cost
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should eventually show the same trend.
 Consumer surplus and producer surplus vs. number of firms in the market.
Figure 11 shows consumer surplus and producer surplus in some cases. The first one (upper
left-hand corner) illustrates the definition of consumer surplus and producer surplus with
increasing marginal cost function and linearly decreasing price function. The second one
(upper right-hand corner) depicts the consumer surplus of our model. The third one (lower
left-hand corner) and the fourth one (lower right-hand corner) represent the consumer
surplus and producer surplus of two other relevant cost structures.
In our model, the cost is linear with the capacity, which leads to a constant marginal
cost. Therefore, the producer surplus is always zero. As the number of firms in the market
increases, market price and cost factors decrease. Therefore, the horizontal line becomes
lower as the number of firms increases, causing consumer surplus to increase. The analytic





















In addition to our constant marginal cost function, we considere two other relevant
cost structures: quadratic and exponential forms, as many studies utilize these two cost
structures.
This quadratic cost function is frequently used in manufacturing industry. For example,







, Dt(N) = AtPt(N) with a function At.




















Therefore, in this case, as the number of firms increases, consumer surplus increases and
producer surplus decreases.
The last one to consider is the exponential form4 of the cost function. If a company can
take advantage of the scale of economy, the cost function might be given as an exponential
form. For example, if the cost function is
Ct(Dt(N)) = Dt(N)e
−AtDt(N) with a function At,
then the supply function is
Pt(N) = (1 − AtDt(N))e
−AtDt(N).
This supply function, which is a decreasing function with Dt(N), is convex, which leads
producer surplus to be negative. In this case, as the number of firms increases, consumer
surplus increases and producer surplus decreases.
 Time to x% price reduction vs. number of firms in the market.










and the price decreases as the number of firms in the market increases. In addition, we
know that the cost factor depreciates and is reflected directly in market price. Then, how
does the price depreciation relate to the number of firms in the market? We answer this
question here. Let us assume that the cost factor depreciates exponentially as



















4Kenyon and Cheliotis[20] used an exponential form of the cost function to reflect of the scale of
economy.
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The above equation shows that price reduction is only dependent on η and not on the
number of firms in the market. Therefore, the time taken until x% price reduction is
n = inf
k
{x > ηk, k ∈ N}
The underlying reason for this phenomenon is the following. As we discussed when we
considered the relationship between market price and the number of firms in the market,
the cost is directly reflected in the market price. In our model, cost depreciation, which is
driven by technology improvement, is given as a function of t, not as a function of number
of firms in the market. Therefore, the market price reduction is not dependent on the
number of firms in the market, and the resulting depreciation pattern of price should be
the same as that of cost. If we model cost depreciation to be dependent on the number of
firms in the market, the price reduction should also be dependent on the number of the
firms in the market.
 Expected number of periods until first expansion vs. number of firms in the market.




K ≤ xi,0,U for all of i. (3.4.10)
Under this constraint, the total market capacity is K, and each firm in the market has
1
N K market share. In addition, every firm is in the KEEP region.
Now we will establish how the number of firms in the market affects the expected
time to first expansion of firms. Let τ(N, K) be the expected waiting time of the first
expansion. Then,






























where C = er(b0 + a0 − e
−ra1)
ε.
From the above equation, we know the expected number of periods until first expansion
decreases as the number of firms in the market increases. However, t is integer valued and
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K is any real number that satisfies equation (3.4.10). To the best of our knowledge, there
is no analytical expression for the expected waiting time for the first expansion in this
case. By approximating the Markov process as a geometric Brownian motion, we do have
an analytic expression for the expected waiting time and thus have some idea about how
the number of firms in the market affects the expected waiting time of the first expansion.
First, we define a Wiener process as
Y (t) = µt + σB(t),
where B(t) is a standard Brownian motion, µ is drift term, and σ is a standard deviation
term. Then we define the approximated geometric Brownian motion as
ξ̃t = ξ0e
Y (t).
























where we used discrete Markov provess with upward movement and downward movement
to model the economic condition as we modeled it in subsection 2.6.2. By matching the
first two moments of ξt and ξ̃t and changing of the parameters as µ = µ́−ε log η, we obtain
the following two equations.
e−tε log η(pu + (1 − p)d) = eµ́−ε log ηt+σ
2t/2, and
e−2tε log η(pu2 + (1 − p)d2) = e2µ́−ε log η+2σ
2t,
Using the above equations, we can easily get expressions for µ́ and σ of p, u, and d. We
can then approximate ξt as a geometric Brownian motion with drift (µ = µ́− ε log η) and
variance (σ2).
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if µ́ − ε log η > 0,
∞ if µ́ − ε log η ≤ 0.
For the calculation to obtain the above equation, see section 3.6.
As we can see from the above equation, the expected time of the first expansion
decreases as the number of firms in the market increases. In addition, with η < 1, log η
is negative, which shortens the expected time of the first expansion. Smaller η represents
steeper cost depreciation, which boosts the firms in the market to invest in additional
capacity.
3.5 Asymmetric Firms in an Oligopolistic Market
In this section, we study the investment decisions of a firm in an oligopolistic market when
the firms in the market have different cost structures. We assume the basic cost structure
is the same in all firms. In other words, for any firm i, the cost occurring at time t is
Ci,t(xi,t−1, xi,t) = bi,txi,t + ai,t(xi,t − xi,t−1)+ − ãi,t(xi,t−1 − xi,t)+.
The cost function still has the same form as that in the case of the monopolistic firm and
in the case of N symmetric oligopolistic firms case. However in this case, the assumption
(bi,t, ai,t, ãi,t) = (bt, at, ãt) for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}
is not made, and we allow
(bi,t, ai,t, ãi,t) 6= (bj,t, aj,t, ãj,t) for all different pair of i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
More specifically, one firm might have a smaller maintenance cost but a larger installa-
tion cost (and/or salvage value) than the other firms. In addition, as we discussed be-
fore, bi,t, ai,t, and ãi,t are functions of t, which might reflect cost depreciation and/or
functions of the number of firms in the market. In addition, we allow each firm to
have different capacity of the previous period. Therefore, at time t, we allow xi,t−1 6=
xj,t−1 for all different pair of i, j ∈ 1, ..., N.
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In the next subsections, we will investigate the existence of the equilibrium and the
uniqueness of the equilibrium point. In section 3.5.1, we will consider a duopoly market
and in section 3.5.2, we will extend the results of section 3.5.1 to the case of N asymmetric
firms.
3.5.1 Two Asymmetric Firms in a Duopoly Market
In this subsection, we consider two firms in a duopoly market. We assume that they
have different cost factors and different capacity position in the previous period. We
will examine the existence of the Cournot equilibrium point and the uniqueness of the
point. As in the monopoly case, the possible decisions for each company are BUY, KEEP,
and SELL. Therefore, with two companies in the market, nine different decisions can be
considered.
The Gi,b and Gi,s functions are derivatives of the temporary value functions for each
case of BUY and SELL.






















for i ∈ {1, 2}.






















for i ∈ {1, 2}.
1. (BUY, BUY): Let (x∗1,BB, x
∗
2,BB) be the solution for a system of equations,
{Gi,b(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) = 0, i = 1, 2}. If x1,t−1 ≤ x
∗
1,BB and x2,t−1 ≤ x
∗
2,BB, then both

















− b1,t − a1,t + e
−ra1,t+1 >︸︷︷︸


















− b2,t − a2,t + e
−ra2,t+1 >︸︷︷︸




G2,b(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) ' −b2,t − a2,t + e
−rã2,t+1 < 0.
In order for limx1,t↓0 G1,b(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) and limx2,t↓0 G2,b(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) to be positive,
















































































































Therefore, if x2,t does not satisfy the above inequality, then x1,t = 0 and firm 2
becomes a monopolistic firm. Also, if x1,t does not satisfy the above inequality, then
x2,t = 0, and firm 1 becomes a monopolistic firm.
The implication of the above inequalities is that, if the optimal capacity of firm
1 (firm 2) is very large, firm 2 (firm 1) is not allowed to enter the market. In
addition, if the cost coefficients of firm 1 (firm 2) is small, the right-hand side of
equality 3.5.1(3.5.2) tends to be large, and the equality has more possibility to
satisfy. Therefore, we conclude that if a firm in duopolistic market has efficient cost
structures, the firm is more likely to survive.
2. (SELL, SELL): Let (x∗1,SS, x
∗
2,SS) be the solution for a system of equations,
{Gi,s(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) = 0, i = 1, 2}. If x1,t−1 ≥ x
∗
1,SS and x2,t−1 ≥ x
∗
2,SS, then both of
















− b1,t − ã1,t + e
−ra1,t+1 >︸︷︷︸


















− b2,s − ã2,t + e
−ra2,t+1 >︸︷︷︸




G2,b(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) ' −b2,t − ã2,t + e
−rã2,t+1 < 0.
In order for limx1,t↓0 G1,s(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) and limx2,t↓0 G2,s(x1,t, x2,t, ξt)to be positive,

































































Therefore, if there is a solution for the (BUY, BUY) case, then there is a solution for
(SELL, SELL). If x2,t does not satisfy the above inequality, then x1,t = 0, and firm
2 becomes a monopolistic firm. Also, if x1,t does not satisfy the above inequality,
then x2,t = 0, and firm 1 becomes a monopolistic firm.
3. (SELL, BUY): Let (x∗1,SB, x
∗
2,SB) be the solution for a system of equations,
{G1,s(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) = 0, G2,b(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) = 0}. If x1,t−1 ≥ x
∗
1,SB and x2,t−1 ≤ x
∗
2,SB,















− b1,t − ã1,t + e
−ra1,t+1 >︸︷︷︸


















− b2,t − a2,t + e
−ra2,t+1 >︸︷︷︸




G2,b(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) ' −b2,t − a2,t + e
−rã2,t+1 < 0.
The conditions for the existence of the solution are inequalities 3.5.3 and 3.5.2.
Therefore, if there are solutions for the cases of (SELL, SELL) and (BUY, BUY), then
the solution for (SELL, BUY) exists.
4. (KEEP, BUY): As x1,t−1 increases beyond x
∗
1,BB, firm 1 goes into the KEEP region.
The optimal capacity in this region is (x∗1,t, x
∗








Therefore, if x2,t−1 < x
∗
2,KB, then firm 2 buys more capacity up to x
∗
2,KB and firm 1
















− b2,t − a2,t + e
−ra2,t+1 >︸︷︷︸




G2,b(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) ' −b2,t − a2,t + e
−rã2,t+1 < 0.
The condition for the existence of the solution is inequality 3.5.2. Therefore, if there
is a solution for the case of (BUY, BUY), the solution for (KEEP, BUY) exists.
 Shape
Using Lemma 3.4.2, we can illustrate the shape of the solution (x∗1,t, x
∗
2,t). The only
difference in the value functions between the case of identical firms and that of the
different firms is the cost coefficient. However, after taking the second derivative
of the value function, the cost coefficient disappears. Therefore the first and the
second derivatives of the G function have the exact same form in the cases of both
identical firms and different firms, which allows us to use the equations (3.4.6) and
(3.4.7) with no changes. However, in this case, the optimal capacities of firms 1 and
2 of the (BUY, BUY) case differ, which, in turn, causes slight difference between the
shape of the (KEEP, BUY) line of the identical firms and the different firms.















The numerator is x∗1,t −
x∗
2,t
ε which can be positive or negative depending on the
solution pair (x∗1,BB, x
∗
2,BB). Without loss of generality, we assume that the cost
structure of firm 2 is more efficient than that of firm 1, which results in x∗1,BB < x
∗
2,BB.
However, how much bigger x∗2,BB is than x
∗
1,BB depends on the cost difference between




ε , which is attained when the cost difference is small and/or when
ε is large:
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In this case, x∗2,t decreases as x
∗






always positive and equation (3.5.5)is always negative. When the cost difference
is not significant, the shape of the (KEEP, BUY) line is similar to that of the




ε , which is attained when the cost difference is significant and/or ε
is small:
In this case, x∗2,t increases at first and decreases later as x
∗
1,t increases. Under
this condition, x∗1,t −
x∗
2,t



























< 1, and equation (3.5.5)
becomes negative.







that point, if firm 1 increases the capacity, which is still less than
x∗
2,t
ε , then firm




ε , the firm 2 decreases its capacity. Therefore, we can conclude
that if the initial capacity of firm 1 is small, firm 2 can increase its capacity
taking cost advantage, but if the initial capacity of firm 1 is too large which
indicates that the firm 1 has occupied a large portion of the market, then firm
2 cannot buy much capacity, which might be disadvantageous to both firms.
Figure 9 illustrates a solution of the case of two asymmetric firms with a fixed eco-
nomic condition. The line for the (KEEP, BUY) shows increasing and then decreasing
trend as x1,t−1(= x
∗
1,KB) increases. In addition, the line for the (KEEP, BUY) shows
concavity with a maximum point.
Remark 8. Notice that concavity is maintained in both cases. However, the shape
in the case of (KEEP, BUY) has a pick point, but the shape in the case of ( BUY,
KEEP) does not.
5. (SELL,KEEP): As x2,t−1 decreases below x
∗
1,SS, firm 2 goes into the KEEP region.
Firm 1 sells the excess capacity and firm 2 maintains its given capacity. The optimal
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2,SK). If x1,t−1 ≥
x∗1,SK, then firm 1 sells off the excess capacity down to x
∗
1,SB and firm 2 maintains
















− b1,t − ã1,t + e
−ra1,t+1 >︸︷︷︸




G1,s(x1,t, x2,t, ξt) ' −b1,t − ã1,t + e
−rã1,t+1 < 0.
The conditions for the existence of the solution is inequality 3.5.3. Therefore, if
there is a solution for the cases of (SELL, SELL), then the solution for (SELL, KEEP)
exists.


















1,t is a concave function with
respect to x∗2,t but with no maximum point, and x
∗
1,t is a decreasing function with
respect to x∗2,t.
7. (BUY, SELL): Same to the case of (BUY, SELL) by exchanging firm 1 with firm 2.
8. (KEEP,SELL): Same to the case of (SELL, KEEP) by exchanging firm 1 with firm 2.
3.5.2 N Asymmetric Firms in an Oligopolistic Market
In this subsection, we want to investigate the investment behavior of a firm when more
than two firms occupy the market and study the existence of the Cournot equilibrium
point and the uniqueness of the point. Let N be the number of firms in the market. Then
for each firm i, there can be three different investment decisions, BUY, KEEP, and SELL,
can be reached, depending on the decision of the other firms and the general economic
condition.
Again, we consider the BUY, KEEP, and SELL cases for a firm separately.
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1. (BUY): Let x∗i,B be the solution of Gi,b(xi,t,
~X−i,t, ξt) = 0, given x−i,t. If xi,t−1 ≤ x
∗
i,B,














− bi,t − ai,t + e
−rai,t+1 >︸︷︷︸




Gi,b(xi,t, x−i,t, ξt) ' −bi,t − ai,t + e
−rãi,t+1 < 0.




















N − 1 − 1ε
)
∑N






The inequality in parentheses is from Lemma 3.5.1 and the amount in the parentheses
is the total market capacity when all N−1 firms are in the BUY region. Therefore, if
all the firms are in the BUY region, there is a solution for firm i. If it does not satisfy
the inequality, then xi,t = 0 and we have to solve the problem again with N−1 firms.
The implication of this inequality is that, if the total capacity of other firms is very
large, firm i is not allowed to enter the market. In addition, if the cost parameters
of firm i is very small, then firm i can enter the market very easily. Therefore, we
conclude that if firms in oligopolistic market have efficient cost structures, all firms
are more likely to survive.
2. (SELL): Let x∗i,S be the solution of Gi,s(xi,t, x−i,t, ξt) = 0, given x−i,t. If xi,t−1 ≥ x
∗
i,S,














− bi,t − ãi,t + e
−rai,t+1 >︸︷︷︸




Gi,s(xi,t, x−i,t, ξt) ' −bi,t − ãi,t + e
−rãi,t+1 < 0.
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max(bi,t + ãi,t − e−rai,t+1, 0+)
)ε
ξt.
Therefore, if there is a solution for the (BUY) case, the solution for the (SELL) case
exists. In addition, the right side of the inequality is the limiting value of the upper
bound for the total market capacity with all N firms. Therefore, the SELL case
always has a solution.
3. KEEP: x∗i,K = xi,t−1 with x
∗
i,B < xi,t−1 < x
∗
i,S.
3.5.3 The Effect of Competition on Market Properties with Cost Deprecia-
tion
As in the previous case, we consider incremental investment with cost depreciation. Adopt-
ing the reasoning in section 2.5, under the condition that ηε ≤ ξt+1ξt for the worst economic



















bi,t + ai,t − e
−rai,t+1
)
, i = 1, ..., N
}
.
Then, we can obtain a solution vector for the above set of N equations. The ith component
















with constraints xi,t > 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., N},
and Xt is the total market capacity given by
N∑
i=1









If there is any i for which xi,t < 0, then set xi,t = 0 and take firm i out of consideration
and solve a set of (N − 1) equations. The equivalent condition for xi,t > 0 is as follows.

















> 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}
(3.5.6)
This condition is also satisfied componentwise.
81
Proof. The proof is straightforward.
This condition indicates that any firm with a large cost structure will be out of the
market. Therefore, if one company enters an oligopolistic market with very small cost
coefficients, the incumbent company with largest cost might be out of the market; other-
wise, the incumbent firms should consider the way to decrease the cost.
 Total market capacity vs. the number of firms in the market.
Does any case in which adding an additional firm to the market causes the total market











N + 1 − 1ε
er
∑N+1






















This violates the necessary condition of xN+1,t > 0. Therefore, we conclude that the
total market capacity increases as the number of firms in the market increases.





















































bi,t + ai,t − e
−rai,t+1
)
with very large N.
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Again, the case of symmetric firms is a special case of asymmetric firms. Because of
increasing capacity, the market price decreases as the number of firms in the market
increases.
 Consumer surplus and producer surplus vs. number of firms in the market.
As discussed in subsection 3.4.3, the producer surplus is zero regardless of the number of
firms in the market.











CSt(N) is an increasing function with respect to the number of firms in the market














i=1 (bi,t + ai,t − e
−rai,t+1).
 Time to an x% price reduction vs. number of firms in the market.
This is the same as the case of identical firms. We can write the relationship between the



































η(bi,t + ai,t − e
−rai,t+1)
)
= ηPt(N) with cost depreciation factor η.
Therefore, for an x% price reduction, we need at least n periods which satisfy,
n = inf
k
{x > ηk, k ∈ N},
regardless of the number of firms in the market.
 Expected number of periods until the first expansion vs. the number of firms in the
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market.




K ≤ xi,0,U for all of i. (3.5.8)
Under this constraint, the total market capacity is K and each firm in the market has
1
N K market share. In addition, all firms are in the KEEP region.
We want to know how the number of firms in the market affects the expected time to
the first expansion.
Let τi(N, K) be the expected waiting time of the first expansion of firm i. Then,
























However, we cannot obtain an analytic form for τi(N, K) in this case. Unlike in the case
of symmetric firms, the lower optimal capacity of one firm reaches 1N K faster and that of
the other firm reaches 1N K later, which makes it hard to determine total market capacity
(Xt) at time τi(N, K). In addition, τi(N, K) is a function of the cost coefficients of firm
i as well as the cost coefficients of other firms, so it will behave differently when we add
another firm in the market, depending on the cost structure of the ith firm, and the cost
structure of the entering firm.
To have some idea of how the expected waiting time of the first expansion of firm i is
























From the result of the case of the symmetric firms, we can expect that equation (3.5.9) is
an increasing function with respect to N for all of t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}.
Using Ci(t) = bi,t + ai,t − e
−rai,t+1 = η0η1 · · · ηt−1(bi,0 + ai,0 − e
−rai,0), equation 3.5.9





























and this equation is expected to increase with respect to N , regardless of the functional
form ηt, because we assumed that deprecation applied to the all firms in the market in
the same manner.
Nevertheless, unlike the result of the case of symmetric firms, the property of equation
(3.5.10) depends on the cost factors of (N + 1) th firm.




















1. if CN+1(t) > Ci(t) for all i, then the function (3.5.10) has more possibility to increase
when we add (N + 1) th firm to the market, and
2. if CN+1(t) > Ci(t) for some i, then the function (3.5.10)has more possibility to in-
crease only for those i when we add (N + 1) th firm to the market but it remains
undetermined for the other firms.
3.6 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1. The value function at the new point





























for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N},
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N,t) is a solution for a set of equations,














































i,t for all i,




i,t for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
In addition, we get equation Vi,t(η ~Xt−1, ηξt) = ηVi,t( ~Xt−1, ξt), which confirms the homo-
geneity of Vi,t.
The waiting time for the geometric Brownian motion. Let X(t) be a Brownian motion
with drift parameter µ and variance parameter σ2. Let us suppose that X(0) = x and
a < x and b > x are fixed quantities. In addition we define a hitting time as
Tab = min{t ≥ 0; X(t) = a or X(t) = b}
Then,















[u(x)(b − a) − (x − a)] . (3.6.2)






and x = 0 with µ = µ́ − ε log η. Therefore,












if µ́ − ε log η > 0,
∞ if µ́ − ε log η ≤ 0.
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Here we want to prove equation (3.6.1) and equation (3.6.2).
At time ∆t,
X(∆t) = X(0) + ∆X = x + ∆X,
where we assume that ∆t is very small so that exiting the interval (a, b) before ∆t can be
neglected.
The conditional probability of exiting at the upper point b is
u(x + ∆X) = P {X(Tab = b|X(∆t) = x + ∆X}
u(x) = P {X(Tab) = b|X(0) = x}
= E
[










Next, expend u(x + ∆X) in a Taylor series,






















































Using boundary conditions u(a) = 0, u(b) = 1, we get the equation (3.6.1).
Next, let us prove the expression for ν(x).
At time ∆t,
X(∆t) = X(0) + ∆X = x + ∆X,
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where we again assume that ∆t is very small so that exiting the interval (a, b) before ∆t
can be neglected.








∆t + ν(x + ∆t)|X(∆t) = x + ∆X
]




Next, expend ν(x + ∆X) in a Taylor series,















































The solution to equation (3.6.4) is




Using boundary conditions u(a) = 0, u(b) = 0, we get the equation (3.6.2).
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(BUY, BUY) (BUY, SELL)(BUY, KEEP)
(KEEP, KEEP)(KEEP, BUY) (KEEP, SELL)







Figure 8: The linearity between the optimal capacities of two firms and the economic
indicator in a duopolistic market
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2 1x t, -
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(SELL, BUY) (SELL, KEEP) (SELL, SELL)
(KEEP, BUY) (KEEP, KEEP) (KEEP, SELL)
(BUY, BUY) (BUY, KEEP) (BUY, SELL)
Figure 9: Optimal capacities of two symmetric firms with a fixed economic indicator
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The optimal capacity of a firm







The total capacity in the market 
Total capacity
Limiting value






The market price of unit capacity
Market price
Limiting value















Number of firms in the market
Lo
g ηx
Expected number of period until x% price reduction









Number of firms in the market
Expected waiting time for the first expansion
Figure 10: Optimal capacity of a firm, total market capacity, market price, consumer
surplus, expected number of periods until certain price reduction and expected waiting
time for the first expansion with the number of firms in the market
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Consumer Surplus and Producer Surplus
Producer Surplus
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Our Model with Increasing Marginal cost










Our Model with Decreasing Marginal cost
Figure 11: Consumer surplus and producer surplus with different cost structures














(BUY, KEEP) ( BUY, SELL) 
11x t, -
2 1x t, -
Figure 12: Optimal capacities of two asymmetric firms with a fixed economic indicator
with concavity of the KEEP/BUY boundary
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CHAPTER IV
AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF CAPACITY
INVESTMENT IN AN OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET
4.1 The Relationship Between The Optimal Capacity of a
Firm and Economic Condition
In this section, our goal is to establish a relationship between the investment behaviors
of firms in a market employing a set of real market data. From the previous section, we















Xt for all i ∈ {1, ..., N},
with Xt, the total market capacity, given by
N∑
i=1























where Ci(t) = bi,t + ai,t − e
−rai,t+1. Ci(t) might depend on the number of firms in the
industry. With our assumption that the cost depreciates exponentially, we can write
Ci(t + 1) = ηtCi(t) for all i ∈ {1, ..., N} and for all t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1}.
We assume that (1) all companies have the same cost depreciation structure, and (2)
maintenance cost, installation cost, and salvage value depreciate at the same rate. As
defined in section 2.5, ηt is a cost depreciation coefficient applicable to the entire industry,
which is dependent on improvements of technology in corresponding sectors/industries,








































for all k = 0, 1, ..., T − t and for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Substituting
xi,t+k = xi,t +
k∑
m=1
x̂i,t+m for all i ∈ {1, ..., N},
the above equation yields
k∑
m=1




















x̂i,t+m = −xi,t + A(t) · B(k)ξt+k with k = 0, 1, ..., T − t,
where B(k) = (ηtηt+1 · · · ηt+k−1)
ε.
If we assume ηm = η for all m = t, t + 1, ..., t + k − 1, the above equation changes to
k∑
m=1
x̂i,t+m = −xi,t + A(t) · η
−kεξt+k with k = 0, 1, ..., T − t. (4.1.1)
In the next subsection, using market data, we establish a linear relationship between
∑k
m=1 x̂i,t+m and η
−kεξt+k, i.e., between the sum of capacity increments of a firm and
economic indicators scaled by the cost depreciation factor, as time goes from t to t + k.
4.2 Experimental Analysis of Telecommunications Market
Data
As our target is the telecommunications market, we choose “Communications Services”
as our specific industry in “Services” sector. In addition, we consider only United States
firms in forming the data set. We consider top-ranked firms in the communications services
industry based on market capitalization.
To perform the empirical analysis, we require market data for capacity/capital incre-
ments for the chosen companies and the economic indicator.
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4.2.1 Basic Statistics of the Capacity Expenditures
Capacity/capital purchase/sale contracts between firms are confidential and not publicly
known. Therefore, we need a proxy for the capacity/capital increment.
Every firm has three financial statements, an Income Statement, a Balance Sheet, and
a Cash Flow Statement that are available to the public. We choose “Capital Expenditures”
in Cash Flow as our proxy for the capacity/capital investment.
In addition, we want to split telecommunications companies into wireless companies
and wireline companies. If wireless companies invest in a previously no-coverage area,
the actual demand can grow more than proportionally to the capacity increment because
of the network effect. Therefore, we decide to apply our model to wireline-dedicated
companies only. However, most telecommunications companies provide a combination of
wireless and wireline services, we need to extract wireline-related investment from Capital
Expenditures. Because capital investment for wireline capacity is not available, we have
analyzed the revenue/profit of companies.
Under the following assumptions:
1. The revenue/profit ratio between wireline and other assets is the same as the capital
expenditure ratio between the two.
2. Without any big changes in a company, it has continued to maintain this ratio
constant for the past several years.
We obtain proxies of capital investment committed to wireline facilities and we used the
quarterly data of Capital Expenditures for the following firms1 from 4th quarter of 1999
to the 3rd quarter of 2004. Table 7 shows the names, market capitalization and wireline
portion of the companies. The letters in parentheses represent the ticker symbols for
each company. (We will use this ticker symbol instead of the full name of the firm from
now on.) As we stated before, we need data for revenues/profits from wireline services
1We choose the top seven firms in the communications services industry. Out of these firms, we eliminate
the Sprint Corp.(FON) due to an insufficient amount of data.
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Table 7: Name, market cap., and wireline service portion of the companies considered
Company Name Market Cap. Wireline Portion
Verizon Communications (VZ) 114.16B 64.1 %
SBC Communications Inc. (SBC) 83.45B 75 %
BellSouth Corporation (BLS) 49.13B approximately 100 %
Nextel Communications (NXTL) 31.63B approximately 0 %
Alltel Corporation (AT) 17.22B 40.2 %
AT&T Corp (T) 14.56B 75% / 100 %
Qwest Communications International Inc.(Q) 7.26B 100 %
only. From S&P 500 corporation record[41], we can find similar data for some companies.
The percentages refer to the revenue/profit portion that comes from the wireline services.
AT&T includes a spin-off of AT&T wireless on July 9th 2001, which corresponds to 25%
of the total capital. Therefore, until the 2nd quarter of 2001 , the wireline services reach
75% and from the 3rd quarter of 2001, these reach approximately 100%. For BLS and
Q, we ignored information services and directory advertising & publishing, and wireless
services which comprise less than 10% of the revenue/profit.
From the wireline and other asset data, we eliminate NXTL from this analysis, con-
fining our study to VZ, SBC, BLS, AT, T, and Q.
First, we perform basic data analysis that includes descriptive statistics and bivariate
correlation coefficients. Tables 8 and 9 show basic descriptive statistics of the capital
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of the capital expenditures of firms
VZ SBC BLS AT T Q
Mean 2270.87 1701.19 1186.95 199.30 1674.63 1414.92
Standard Deviation 642.99 904.29 462.51 308.43 1113.72 1477.75
Range 2165.94 3499.50 1467.00 1411.70 3711.00 6207.00
Minimum 1521.73 672.75 588.00 57.53 441.00 418.00
Maximum 3687.67 4172.25 2055.00 1469.23 4152.00 6625.00
Ratio(Range/Mean) 0.95 2.06 1.24 7.08 2.22 4.39
Ratio(Std./Mean) 0.28 0.53 0.39 1.55 0.67 1.04
expenditures of each firm and bivariate correlation coefficient between firms, respectively.
AT has the largest std./mean ratio and largest range/mean ratio. Thus we can conclude
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Table 9: Pairwise correlation coefficient between firms
VZ SBC BLS AT T Q
VZ correlation 1.000 0.477 0.677 -0.186 0.404 0.139
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.034 0.001 0.433 0.077 0.559
SBC correlation 0.477 1.000 0.883 -0.080 0.856 0.849
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.034 . 0.000 0.739 0.000 0.000
BLS correlation 0.677 0.883 1.000 -0.136 0.760 0.686
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.000 . 0.569 0.000 0.001
AT correlation -0.186 -0.080 -0.136 1.000 0.021 -0.141
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.433 0.739 0.569 . 0.929 0.554
T correlation 0.404 0.856 0.760 0.021 1.000 0.627
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.929 . 0.003
Q correlation 0.139 0.849 0.686 -0.141 0.627 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.559 0.000 0.001 0.554 0.003 .
that AT is very volatile. The capital investment of AT is negatively correlated with that
of VZ, SBC, BLS, and Q and it is positively correlated with that of T. However, none of
the correlation coefficients of AT with other firms is significant. Therefore, we can assume
that AT behaves independently of other firms, and the investment behavior of AT is very
different from that of other firms. Thus, we eliminate AT from our experimental analysis.
Quite different from AT, VZ is a very stable firm and investment decisions are con-
sistent throughout the period and its range/mean ratio of the capital expenditure is the
smallest, indicating the amount of investment does not change much during the period.
In addition, Table 9 shows that VZ, SBC, and BLS are positively correlated with
95% confidence. SBC, BLS, T, and Q are positively correlated with 95%(99%) confi-
dence. Therefore, we can assume that all the firms, except AT, exhibit similar investment
behavior.
4.2.2 Basic Statistics of the Economic Indicators
In an effort to determine our economic indicator, we choose three candidates: Civil Em-
ployment, the Consumer Confidence Index, and the Nasdaq Telecommunications Index
(IXUT). Again, IXUT is a ticker symbol for the Nasdaq Telecommunications Index. (We
will use this ticker instead of the full name.) The first and second are general economic
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indicators and the third is a sector/industry-specific economic indicator.
From Economic Indicators [42], the indices on the Gross Domestic Product, the Real
Gross Domestic Product and other factors2 all serve as general economic indicators.
Among these economic indicators, we choose Civilian Employment (Employment) as a
possible proxy of an economic indicator for the telecommunications market. Our rationale
is that as employment increases, both Internet usage at work and the number of mobile
phone subscribers increase, and thus the demand for additional capacity increases. The
reason we select the Consumer Confidence Index as a candidate as a proxy of an economic
indicator is similar to the reason why we select Employment. As consumers often expect
better future economic conditions, they increase their spending, which will affect Inter-
net/mobile phone usage. For IXUT, we choose it because it is a strong indicator of the
telecommunications market.
We take the quarterly data from the 3th quarter of 1996 to the 3rd quarter of 2004
and compute the basic statistics, and list them in Tables 10 and 11.
Figure 13 shows the trend of these three economic indicators. Employment shows
clearly the increasing trend with small volatility of the three indicators. Consumer Con-
fidence Index does not show any clear drift, but has a larger variation than Employment.
IXUT does not show any trend, but clearly indicates when the Internet bubble existed.
The graph shows that Internet bubble started around the beginning of 1998 and ended
at the beginning of 2002. During this period, numerous telecommunications firms were
established and then became defunct.
The trend is well explained in Table 10, which shows basic descriptive statistics. In
addition to the basic statistics of the data, it shows the basic statistics of the return
( ξtxit−1 − 1) of that period. In the prediction of future economic conditions, the value of
return reflected in the economic indicator is more meaningful than the bare number.
Table 11 shows the bivariate correlation coefficients of economic indicators. When








































































































































Figure 13: Trend of economic indicators and bivariate matrix graphs between economic
indicators
we compare the return, with 95% confidence, we cannot determine if they are posi-
tively/negatively correlated. However, we can say Employment and the Consumer Con-
fidence Index are negatively correlated and the Consumer Confidence Index and IXUT
are positively correlated with 95% (99%) confidence. Therefore, we can expect a nega-
tively correlated trend between Employment and the Consumer Confidence Index and a
positively correlated trend between the Consumer Confidence Index and IXUT.
As shown in Figure 13, Employment and the Consumer Confidence Index are nega-
tively correlated and the Consumer Confidence Index and IXUT are positively correlated.
However, when we compare the returns, we find no clear relationship, but instead com-
pletely independent behavior.
The matrix scatter plot in Figure 13 illustrates this relationship very well. The trend
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between Employment and the Consumer Confidence Index is downward sloping and the
trend between the Consumer Confidence Index and IXUT is curved and upward sloping.
In addition, the relationship between Employment and IXUT appears to be random.
Table 10: Descriptive statistics of the economic indicators
Employment CCI IXUT
return return return
Mean 134254.88 0.0029 114.72 0.0019 360.90 0.0133
Standard Deviation 3320.02 0.0044 22.0 0.1177 248.24 0.1914
Range 12232.00 0.0226 81.10 0.5991 890.89 0.8151
Minimum 127248.00 -0.0070 61.40 -0.2392 96.55 -0.3626
Maximum 139480.00 0.0156 142.50 0.3599 987.44 0.4525
Ratio (Std./Mean) 0.02473 1.5410 0.1919 61.2154 0.6878 14.3421
Table 11: Pairwise correlation coefficients of the economic indicators
Return
Emt. CCI IXUT Emt. CCI IXUT
Emt. correlation 1.000 -0.541 -0.082 1.000 0.314 0.232
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.001 0.650 . 0.080 0.200
CCI correlation -0.541 1.000 0.739 0.314 1.000 0.206
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 . 0.000 0.080 . 0.259
IXUT correlation -0.082 0.739 1.000 0.232 0.206 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.650 0.000 . 0.200 0.259 .
From this basic statistical analysis, we conclude that Employment is the most stable
variable, which might lead us to choose Employment as our economic indicator. To con-
firm that Employment is best best economic indicator for our model, we perform linear
regression on all three economic indicators and the capital increments of the firms in the
next subsection.
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4.2.3 Regression Analysis between the Capacity Expenditure of Firms and
the Economic Indicators
From the previous basic analysis, we briefly examine the characteristics of our data. We
expect that AT will behave differently from VZ, SBC, BLS, T, and Q, so we exclude
AT from our analysis for this reason. In addition, we consider Employment is the most
appropriate economic indicator. To confirm these two decisions, we perform basic linear
regression analysis on all three economic indicators and the capital increments of the firms.
To perform a linear regression, we assume ηi = (0.5)
1/8 for all i = t, t + 1, ..., t + k,
ε = 1.5. The results appear in Table 12.
Table 12: The results of regression analysis on capacity movement of firms and employ-
ment, the Consumer Confidence Index, and the IXUT
Employment
R2 Intercept p-value Slope p-value
VZ 0.9696 2687.5 0.2864 0.0677 0.0000
SBC 0.9130 9950.2 0.0012 0.0410 0.0000
BLS 0.9273 5451.1 0.0059 0.0306 0.0000
T 0.8673 12206.0 0.0009 0.0385 0.0000
Q 0.8134 14450 0.0000 0.0261 0.0000
Consumer Confidence Index
VZ 0.8884 1117.9 0.8234 100.51 0.0000
SBC 0.8143 9395.2 0.0297 60.14 0.0000
BLS 0.8329 4961.4 0.0924 44.96 0.0000
T 0.7425 12246.0 0.0141 55.22 0.0000
Q 0.7079 14325 0.0005 37.77 0.0000
Nasdaq Telecommunications Index
VZ 0.2783 9349.3 0.5894 35.97 0.0168
SBC 0.1856 17919.5 0.1301 18.36 0.0579
BLS 0.2054 10706.7 0.2107 14.28 0.0448
T 0.1370 21990.8 0.0648 15.16 0.1082
Q 0.0974 22597 0.0113 8.9599 0.1803
Of the three economic indicators, Employment has the best fit for linear regression.
Employment and the Consumer Confidence Index shows similar results, with similar order
of the firms in intercept, slope and respective p-values. Therefore, Employment and the
Consumer Confidence Index show similar interpretation for the firms in cost structures
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and pre-existing capacities of the firms at the beginning of the period considered. As we
explained before, the telecommunication companies can use Employment and/or the Con-
sumer Confidence Index as their general economic indicators. Because telecommunication
companies can expect more customers as Employment is increasing. The same if true for
the Consumer Confidence Index. However, sector/industry-specific economic indicator,
IXUT in our case, instead revealing how this industry does in the market, can be used to
measure the performance of the industry.
The residual graphs show a trend. Figure 14 shows a significant trend in residuals
with respect to Employment. The first half of the graph shows an upward trend and the















































Figure 14: Residual graphs of the capacity movement of firms and Employment
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The underlying reason for these findings can be found in the trend of the sector/industry-
specific variable, IXUT. The movement of IXUT during this period is illustrated in Figure
14 for comparison.
Until the 4th quarter of 2001(or close to it), IXUT decreases very rapidly, and the
residual graphs might reflect it. Therefore, we can infer from the residual graphs that the
first half of the period reflects the Internet boom and over invested telecommunication
and the last half of the period reflects the failure of some of the firms or the adjustments
in the invested capital of the surviving firms.
In subsections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5, we will consider the Internet bubble phenomenon in our
model and attempt to fix this curved residual graphs.
4.2.4 Regression Analysis between the Capacity Expenditures of Firms and
the Economic Indicator by Incorporating of Industry-Specific Economic
Conditions
One way to fix the residual trend can be to incorporate a sector/industry-specific variable
to cost depreciation. As Kou and Kou[22] mentioned, the growth rate of an industry can
be represented by the labor force of the R&D department, which might be directly related
to technology improvement and cost depreciation. We change the cost depreciation factor
η(·) as a function of the sector/industry-specific variable. Here, we used IXUT as our
sector/industry-specific variable. When IXUT is high-valued, firms experience consider-
able cost depreciation and when IXUT is low-valued, firms have small cost depreciation.
This concept is used to calculate the cost depreciation employing IXUT.
We use a Simple Moving Average (SMA) of the historical returns of IXUT. Moving
average is widely used estimating the future trends of a financial asset. In addition,
the return of IXUT in the period is so volatile that it cannot sufficiently explain the
cost depreciation trend in the market. Also, when IXUT is high-valued, firms in the
telecommunication industry do well and thus may invest more in research, which will lead
to later improvements in technology.
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as the cost depreciation for the period t. Here 1n
∑n
j=1 SMAj is the average of the SMAs
during the considered period. By dividing the ratio of the value to the average by 16
and adding 116 , we lessen the effect of volatility. With SMAt, which is the same as the
mean of the SMAs, we have the same cost depreciation as in the case of the constant cost
depreciation.
Table 13: The result of regression analysis on the capacity movement of firms and
Employment with different cost depreciation during each period
R2 Intercept p-value Slope p-value
VZ 0.9918 -1613 0.2855 0.0702 0.0000
SBC 0.9601 7202 0.0022 0.0431 0.0000
BLS 0.9689 3438 0.0178 0.0320 0.0000
T 0.9350 9239 0.0016 0.0412 0.0000
Q 0.8816 12716 0.0000 0.0276 0.0000
Table 13 presents the results, which show a better fit than the case with same cost
depreciation for all the periods and improved residual graphs. The table reflects higher
R2 values for all firms than those of the same cost depreciation case. The intercept values
are still positive, indicating that the residual graphs are still curved.
4.2.5 Regression Analysis between the Capacity Expenditures of Firms and
the Economic Indicator with a Smaller Set of Data
As we explained in subsection 4.2.3, we can divide the data set into two parts. The first
belongs to the Internet bubble and the last half corresponds to the adjustment period.
We deleted the first half and perform linear analysis on the remaining data set.
Table 14, which shows the regression results for only the last half of the data, includes
only 10 data sets from the 2nd quarter of 2002 to the 4th quarter of 2004. We performed
linear regression with constant cost depreciation and with different cost depreciation for
each period using the equation (4.2.1). The results show better fit in both cases, and the
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Table 14: The result of regression analysis between the Capacity Movement of firms and
Employment with the data set after the Internet bubble
With Constant Cost Depreciation Factor
R2 Intercept p-value Slope p-value
VZ 0.9971 -10346 0.0000 0.085 0.0000
SBC 0.9917 -4543 0.0000 0.043 0.0000
BLS 0.9949 -3657 0.0000 0.033 0.0000
T 0.9338 -887 0.3907 0.032 0.0000
Q 0.9725 -38493 0.0000 0.211 0.0000
With Different Cost Depreciation Factor
VZ 0.9981 -15668 0.0000 0.1099 0.0000
SBC 0.9963 -7258 0.0000 0.0552 0.0000
BLS 0.9976 -5758 0.0000 0.0431 0.0000
T 0.9666 -3249 0.0044 0.0429 0.0000
Q 0.9975 -3907 0.0000 0.0280 0.0000
residuals appear to be random. Again, we obtain better result when we incorporate the
sector/industry-specific variable in cost depreciation.
From the result, we can deduce some relationship between the cost structure and the
capacity position of the firms at the beginning of the period. We analyze the results of
the case with different cost depreciation.
First of all, let us compare the intercept of the regression analysis result. The negative
value of the intercept represents the capacity position at the beginning of the period,
which is, in this case, at the end of the 1st quarter of 2002. This negative value of the
intercept initially decreases to T and slightly increases at Q. We do not have any available
data set that provides the exact capacity position at the beginning of the period. On
the Balance Sheet of each firm, the “Net Fixed Asset (Property Plant and Equipment)”
provides a proxy for the capacity position during that period. By doing some calculations
with the revenue/profit portion of the wireline, we obtain the data for the Net Fixed Asset
dedicated to wireline services. Although the data in Table 15 do not match the intercept
from the regression result exactly, they do not differ significantly. In addition, AT&T does
not have publish, print and advertising services, but BLS and Q have that these services,
which can translate into a higher value intercept in the regression analysis. Therefore,
105
Table 15: Capacity position at the end of 4th quarter of 2001
VZ SBC BLS T Q
47703 37370 24943 26803 29479
even though the negative value of the intercept of BLS has a larger value than that of T,
it does not mean the capital/capacity position of the wireline of BLS is larger than that
of AT&T. Therefore, we can conclude that the intercept accurately explains the initial
capacity of the firms.
Next, let us compare the slopes of the regression result. The slope is the form of
(1 − Ci · A) with constant A. According to Lemma 3.5.1, this value should be always
positive. In addition, if a firm has an efficient cost structure, this slope has a large value,
and if a firm has a poor cost structure, the slope has a small value. From VZ to Q, the
slope shows a constantly decreasing trend. Possible interpretations of this result are that
if the firm has larger assets, then it has a more efficient cost structure.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Summary of the Theoretical and Numerical Findings
and Strategic Implications
We investigate the investment behavior of a firm in a telecommunications industry under
uncertain economic condition. We formulate the investment decision problem as a discrete
Markov process. By differentiating the purchase price and resale value of the capacity, we
incorporate partial reversibility of an investment that presents a range of optimal capacity
with a lower bound and an upper bound. In addition, the optimal strategy is one of the
threshold type. We are able to characterize the optimal policy regions as buying new
capacity, maintaining status quo, and divesting capacity.
By using the linearity between the optimal capacity and the economic condition, the
problem has been reduced to finding the slopes of the boundaries of BUY/KEEP and
KEEP/SELL. We perform a series of sensitivity analyses which show the relationship be-
tween the slopes of the boundaries of BUY/KEEP and KEEP/SELL and the parameters
as follows. • As cost coefficients decrease, the values of the slopes increase. If a firm’s
cost parameters become smaller, the size of capacity investment increases. In addition,
this investment behavior is amplified by large ε values because a large ε implies that the
demand for capacity is more sensitive to the price.
• As the variance of future economic condition increases, the slope of the boundary of
BUY/KEEP decreases in the case with cost depreciation. In the case without cost de-
preciation, an increase in the variance of future economic condition causes the slopes of
BUY/KEEP and KEEP/SELL boundaries to decrease and increase, respectively. As the
variance of future economic condition increases, a firm’s investment decision becomes con-
servative, which means that the activity for buying new capacity and selling off the current
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capacity is reduced which is illustrated by the increased KEEP region in the solution space.
Moreover, with cost depreciation, a firm tends to delay the investment decision for BUY to
take advantage of the cost reduction in the next period, and it tends to sell more capacity
to take advantage of a higher salvage value in this period.
• As the elasticity parameter, ε, increases, the slopes of the BUY/KEEP boundaries increase
at first and then decrease. However, within a reasonable range of ε, the slopes tend to
increase, a fact of which agrees with our intuition about a firm’s investment behavior when
the demand elasticity is large. With a large ε value, a firm can earn more revenue from
increasing capacity by lowering price as stated in the general theory in microeconomics.
With cost depreciation and a dynamics of moderately changing economic condition,
we find analytic expression for the BUY/KEEP boundaries, which establish independence
between investment decisions in adjacent period. Therefore, the multiple-time investment
problem is reduced to a one-time investment problem. In this case, the optimal increment
is determined by the realization of uncertain economic conditions. Moreover, using this
analytic expression between capacity investment and exogenous economic indicators, we
obtain a capital investment trajectory by observing the realization of an uncertain eco-
nomic indicator. In addition, the corresponding price trajectory is obtained through the
price-demand function, given the capacity movement. The resulting trajectories of the
capacity and price movement shows that market price decreases exponentially and market
demand increases exponentially. These results are consistent with the findings in existing
work by Kenyon and Cheliotis[20] and [21] and Lanning, Mitra, Wang, and Wright[25].
Next, we consider the investment behavior of a firm in an oligopolistic market. We
formulated investment decision behavior within the Cournot framework. We consider this
problem in two cases: one with symmetric firms and the other with asymmetric firms. For
each case, we show the existence and the uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium point, and
we derive some conditions under which the solutions exist. In doing so, we investigate the
investment behavior of a firm in a competitive market and obtain the following results:
• If a firm already had a very large capacity, then a new firm is hard to enter the market
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unless the new firm’s cost structure is very efficient.
• If a firm already a considerable capacity position, then a new firm can enter the market
with smaller capacity than the incumbent firm’s capacity. However, the market share of
the new firms increases with time to that of incumbent firm then they have the same cost
structures. In the case of asymmetric firms, the new firms increases its market share with
time, but the ration of the market share between the firms in the market is dependent on
the cost structure of each firm.
In the case of asymmetric firms, we identify the condition under which a firm can enter
the market: the new firm can not have large cost factors compared with other firms. In
addition, if an incumbent firm has large cost factors compared with the new entry firm, the
incumbent firm has to restructure the system to lower the cost; otherwise, the incumbent
firm will be forced out of the market.
In both cases, we illustrate various aspects of market properties with the number of
firms in the market as follows:
• Total market capacity in use, which increases with the number of firms in the market.
• Market price, which decreases with the number of firms in the market.
• Consumer surplus, which increases with the number of firms in the market.
• Time to certain percentage of price reduction, which does not depend on the number of
firms in the market.
• Expected number of periods until first expansion, which decreases with the number of
firms in the market.
We find an analytic expression for total market capacity, market price, consumer sur-
plus, and time to a certain percentage of price reduction with limiting values as the number
of firms goes to infinity. For the expected number of periods until the first expansion, we
find an analytic expression by approximating to geometric Brownian motion. In addi-
tion, dramatic changes occur when the market structure changes from a monopoly to a
duopoly. For example, total market capacity in use is more than doubled. However, when
the number of firms in the market changes from two to more, little change takes place.
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The results are reasonable in that:
• Competition increases the supply and demand of the capacity by lowering the price.
• competition increases consumer surplus and social welfare, which much of the literature
addresses.
• Price reduction is directly related to cost depreciation, which is not modeled to be
dependent on the number of firms in the market. Therefore, the price reduction is not
dependent on the number of firms in the market.
• As competition increases, the time until the first expansion shortens.
Employing market data from the telecommunications service industry, we have carried
out a series of empirical analyses. When we incorporate sector/industry-specific economic
conditions into cost depreciation, we obtain a better fit from regression analysis than
when we use constant cost depreciation. This result is consistent with the result of the
previous work of Kou and Kou[22], who showed the growth rate of growth stock can
be represented by the R&D labor force in the market. In our case, we use the Nasdaq
Telecommunications Index as our sector/industry-specific economic condition. Its growth
rate is positively related to the R&D labor force in the telecommunications market, which
leads to technology improvement and corresponding cost depreciation. Therefore, uti-
lizing the sector/industry-specific index to calculate cost depreciation provides a better
understanding of the investment behavior of firms than simply adopting a constant cost
depreciation factor throughout the period.
For our general economic indicator, we choose Civilian Employment (Employment).
The regression result shows Employment should be a strong candidate for the economic
indicator in the proposed model. Due to the clear increasing trend with moderate volatility
of Employment, firms in the market continue to invest in capital/capacity. However,
Employment is not directly related to the telecommunications industry, but indirectly
related to it, as personal and work related Internet/mobile phone usage normally increases
as employment increases.
When we consider the data set that belongs to after-Internet-bubble period, results
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accurately explain the cost structure and the capacity position of firms at the beginning
of the period. However, the amount of data is very small, so we must continue to examine
the accuracy of this result.
From this result, we can also conclude that firms have different cost structures which
relate to the size of the firm with regard to market capitalization and assets. This rela-
tionship of cost structure to the size of the firm is intuitively correct, as larger firms are
more likely to have an efficient cost structure. In addition, we obtain all positive values for
the slopes from the regression analysis, confirming Lemma 3.5.1, which indicates that the
cost structure of a firm is not much different from that of the other firms in the market.
5.2 Future Work
In our model, we did not consider depreciation of capital/capacity, which has been con-
sidered in other literature. We believe that depreciation of the capital/capacity can be
incorporated in the proposed model without much effort. In addition, we did not consider
the lead time of the facility, so our model can easily be applied to cases in which the lead
time is very short. For example, an incumbent local phone company can use the copper
line to provide ADSL service by deploying some equipment. In addition, an Internet ser-
vice provider can purchase some fiber optic lines from a vender that already has dark fiber
underground and sells it by lighting it up, but this would not apply to a firm that lays
the new fiber optic lines and waits for the completion of the work.
Finally, we assumed that the cost depreciation can be a function of the sector/industry-
specific parameter, but we ignored the fact that this cost depreciation can differ depending
on the characteristics of a firm. If wireline service providers do not invest much in research
fund or purchase the equipment in the market, this uniform cost depreciation assumption
could prove to be true to all firms. However, if a firm spend invest a large amount of
money in research and makes technological improvements within the firm, then the cost
depreciation factor for the firm will differ from that of other firms.
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If we consider the factors of depreciation, lead time lag, and firm-specific cost depreci-
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